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THE § 501(c) (3) TAX EXEMPTION
PETER D. BLUMBERGt
INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 1965, the University of Florida football coach
enlisted a professor to develop a high-energy drink to replace the
nutrients his players were perspiring away on the humid practice
field.' The University now receives $4.5 million per year in royalty
proceeds from the Quaker Oats Corporation as a result of this
professor's invention: Gatorade.2 The potential for profit may be
even greater for Professor Milton Torres and Florida International
University ("F.I.U."). Torres and F.I.U. hold the patent for polyiso-
cyanurate, or "Pantherskin," a polymer coating that can increase the
service life of aircraft skin while also making it more fire-resistant.'
In the wake of the Valujet crash and the bombing of TWA Flight 800,
the FAA is investigating the possibility of using Pantherskin in
t B.A. 1990, Yale University;J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Pennsylvania Law
School. I would like to thank Frank Roth and Rebecca Rudnick for helping me to
develop this topic and for comments on an earlier draft. None of this would have
been possible without the efforts of the membership of the Law Review, and I would
like to give special acknowledgment to Peter Ryan for his remarkable editorial
support. Finally, I would like to thank Suzanne Yelen, both for her substantive and
editorial advice on this Comment and for her support during my law school career.
I SeeDavid Villano, BigMoney on Campus, FLA. TREND, Dec. 1, 1995, at 66, available
in 1995 WL 8683002 (describing the most notable technologies developed on the
Florida campuses).
2 See id. (noting that if the royalty-sharing arrangement were made today, the
University of Florida would be receiving substantially more royalty income); see also
Linda Williams, Academia Wises up on Patents, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1990, at Al
(quoting the University of Florida's director of corporate programs in 1990 as saying
"If we had done Gatorade right, we would be getting $5 or $6 million [a year]"
(alteration in original)).
I See Villano, supra note 1, at 66.
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American fuselages.' For FI.U., Pantherskin may become "the
proverbial pot of gold at the end of the school's research rainbow."5
Not every invention need be of blockbuster proportions for a
university to see income from licensing royalties. Louisiana State
University, for example, has collected $65,000 from the sale of
laboratory-developed fish bait.6 While such a sum is not significant
to a university budget, no school in the country would object to the
infusion of an additional $65,000.
These examples demonstrate the phenomenon of university
technology transfer, through which a university makes an invention
or discovery available to the for-profit sector for commercial
development.7 One of the prevalent forms of technology transfer is
patent licensing, in which a university licenses a patent or other
valuable right to a corporation. In exchange for the grant of the
license or right, the university receives fixed or contingent royalty'
payments annually or on some other negotiated basis.9 This
marriage benefits both partners: the university develops a new
revenue stream and the corporation gains access to heretofore
untapped technologies that may be prohibitively expensive to
develop in its own laboratories.
' See Carla Koehl & Sarah Van Boven, Bombproo?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 26, 1996, at 6,
6.
' Villano, supra note 1, at 66.
6 See Randy McClain, LSU Professor Proposes Sales of Research as Fund-Raising Tool,
BATON ROUGE ADVoc., Sept. 5, 1995, at 1C. In addition, Lousiania State University
is considering a proposal to expand licensing activities beyond the natural sciences to
political science and economic research. See id.
' For purposes of this Comment, I will use the phrase "technology transfer" in the
same manner as the Association of University Technology Managers ("AUTM")
defines "technology licensing": "Technology Licensing includes activities associated
with the evaluation and marketing of technology (including trademarks but not
university's insignia) and intellectual property management, and those of license
administration. It does not include activities associated with industry research
agreements." ASSOCIATION OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, INC., AUTM LICENSING SURVEY:
FY 1994 SURVEY SUMMARY AND SELECTED DATA FY 1991-FY 1994 13 (1995) [hereinafter
AUTM SuRVEY].
s For purposes of this Comment, "royalty" is defined to include:
[L]icense issue fees, payments under options, annual minimums, running
royalties, termination payments, the amount of equity received when cashed-
in, and software end user license fees equal to $1000 or more, but not
research funding, patent reimbursement fees, a valuation of equity not
cashed-in, software end user license fees [less than] $1000, or trademark
licensing royalties from university insignia.
Id.
9 See 1 ROBERT M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON LICENSING § 2.57 (1996) ("Normally,
patents are licensed with a view toward collection of royalties.").
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Not all voices inside or outside the academy, however, express the
same enthusiasm regarding technology transfer and the increasingly
close relationship between universities and corporations. Former
Harvard University President Derek Bok, in his final annual report
to the school's Board of Overseers, warned that "[f]lashing yellow
lights should appear, however, whenever the institution seeks to
make a profit on basic academic functions... such as ... research
... in order to finance its other activities."'0 Bok's remarks directly
addressed the issue of research and royalty income, as he noted that
greater university efforts to transform discoveries into products and
services may lead to the sacrificing of "essential values."" The
Deputy Director of the National Institutes of Health, Daryl
Chamblee, in testimony before the Senate, "acknowledged that the
heightened involvement of industry in academic research has
prompted concern that tech transfer might stifle the free exchange
of knowledge in the academic community, promote secrecy and
distort research priorities to conform with commercial aims." 2 The
fear is that in time universities will resemble nothing more than
commercial research centers. As one writer has argued, "MIT looks
more like a corporation engaged in the relatively profitable business
of producing ideas that it licenses to the highest bidders.""
Holding aside philosophical debates regarding the "mission" of
the university, why should increased emphasis on technology transfer
and patent licensing be of legal concern? The difficulty arises when
one considers that universities are able to operate technology-transfer
ventures with a considerable public subsidy-namely, their long-
standing exemption from the federal income tax 14 as well as state
and local property taxes." First, academic researchers use laborato-
'0 Derek Bok, Universities: Their Temptations and Tensions, 18 J.C. & U.L. 1, 16
(1991).
Id. (expressing the fear that uncontrolled technology transfer will lead to
conflicts of interest, secrecy and the loss of a university's reputation for objectivity).2 Patents: Bayh-Dole Act Has Met Its Tech Transfer Goal, Witnesses Tell Pane4 Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA), Apr. 20, 1994, § A (Regulation, Economics & Law), at 75,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Drexec File [hereinafter Tech Transfer Goal]
(summarizing testimony on proposed changes to the Bayh-Dole Act).
1s Wade L. Robison & John T. Sanders, The Myths of Academia: Open Inquiry and
FundedResearch, 19J.C. & U.L. 227, 231 (1993) (noting that MIT creates over 100 new
patents a year and licenses at a rate of 53% (citing Marjorie Shaffer, When Research
Labs Go After Business, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 23, 1992, § 3 (Business), at 10)).
11 SeeI.R.C. § 501(c) (3) (1994) (stating that corporations or foundations organized
and operated for educational purposes are tax-exempt).
15 See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. X, § 6 ("[A]ll property, real and personal, not held for
private or corporate profit and used exclusively for.., schools and colleges... may
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ry facilities situated on tax-exempt property to develop inventions
that will subsequently aid corporations in creating new (and
profitable) products.' 6 Second, the income derived from these
discoveries, including licensing and royalty income, is exempt from
federal income taxation.'7 In each of the aforementioned examples
of university technology transfer-Gatorade, Pantherskin and the
L.S.U. fish bait-the universities involved paid (or would pay) no
taxes on the revenue received. The same royalty payments, however,
would be taxable if the recipient were a commercial enterprise.'
8
The income tax exemption granted by § 501 (c) (3) of the Federal
Income Tax Code is vital to the continuing survival of the universi-
ty. 9 Currently, the value of the federal exemption and other tax
breaks amounts to nearly $4 billion a year.2" As the university and
its faculty become increasingly oriented toward promoting technolo-
gy transfer and developing intellectual property with potential
commercial value, the tax exemption for licensing and royalty
income derived from such activity may be called into question. It is
well settled that an otherwise-exempt organization that engages in an
be exempted from taxation by general law."); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 7-
202(b)(i) (1994) ("[Plroperty is not subject to property tax if the property .... is
necessary for and actually used exclusively for a charitable or educational purpose to
promote the general welfare of the people of the State.").
16 See Gilbert M. Gaul & Neill A. Borowski, A Tax Break Colleges Can Bank On, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Apr. 20, 1993, at Al, A6 (noting that commercial activity is one of many
income sources for universities that currently remain tax-exempt).
17 SeeI.R.C. § 512(b) (2), (8) (1994); BRUCE P. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS 950 (6th ed. 1992) (examining tax issues associated with research
income); see also infra Part II.C.
"8 See Consuelo L. Kertz, Tax Exempt Organizations and Commercially Sponsored
Scientific Research, 9 J.C. & U.L. 69, 76-77 (1982-1983) (arguing that most of the
research undertaken by a university would be considered a trade or business if it were
conducted by a commercial enterprise).
19 Most commentary that has dealt with the § 501 (c) (3) tax exemption issue pays
only passing attention to educatiorial institutions. See John D. Colombo, Why Is
Harvard Tax-Exempt?. (And Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption for Private Educational
Institutions), 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 841, 843 n.6 (1993) (listing articles that have discussed
nonprofit organizations and the federal tax exemption and describing the amount of
attention given specifically to educational institutions). The few commentators who
have addressed the royalty-income question directly generally conclude that
universities have little to be concerned about, arguing that current tax-code exclusions
are sufficient to exempt from the income tax royalty income derived from technology
transfer. See Kertz, supra note 18, at 78-79 (arguing that the income tax exclusions
under I.R.C. § 512(b) (7)-(9) are sufficiently broad to encompass most research
activities of a college or university).
2 See Gaul & Bbrowski, supra note 16, at Al (explaining both the origin and the
current effect of the university tax exemption).
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"unrelated trade or business" must pay income tax on its "unrelated"
income.2" The question, therefore, is whether changes in the
manner in which technology-transfer research is conducted and
emphasized are so at odds with the letter and spirit of the tax
exemption that subsequent revenues should be subject to federal
income taxation under the unrelated business income tax ("UBIT").
In other words: Has the increased focus on technology transfer
moved the university so far from the educational and scientific
missions on which the exemption was premised that the gains from
patent licensing should be taxable?
This Comment will examine income generated from technology-
transfer activity and determine that in certain circumstances-and
contrary to the current state of the law-such revenue should be
taxable as unrelated business income. Part I will examine the scope
of the university-industry technology-transfer relationship as it exists
today and identify the reasons for the explosive growth in these
arrangements over the past fifteen years. Part II will analyze the
applicable sections of the Tax Code and corresponding regulations
to determine how the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS" or "the
Service") has treated the § 501 (c) (8) tax-exempt status of universities
and unrelated business income, concentrating on income derived
from research endeavors.
Part III will examine the manner in which the modem academic
research environment has been affected by the promise of technolo-
gy-transfer income. It will look at restrictions on publication and the
public dissemination of research results, the granting of exclusive
licenses, effects on teaching, conflicts of interest and the potential
compromise of academic freedom. In considering each of these
issues, the Comment will consider whether income from the research
enterprise should be subjected to UBIT due to the failure to conform
to the public interest rationale behind the university tax exemption.
The Comment will conclude in Part IV that a conflict exists between
the unfettered pursuit of technology-transfer revenues and the letter
and spirit of higher education's tax exemption. It proposes creating
two types of technology-transfer arrangements to give universities the
"' See I.R.C. § 511(a) (1994); Iowa State Univ. of Sci. and Tech. v. United States,
500 F2d 508, 516 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (holding that revenues from the operation of a
university-owned television station were unrelated business income and therefore
taxable, despite the fact that such revenues were ultimately destined for educational
uses); see also WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION
§ 9.3.5.1 (3d ed. 1995) (explaining the unrelated business income tax and its effect
on entrepreneurial activities).
1996]
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choice, depending on the facts and circumstances of each individual
case, whether to execute a taxable or a nontaxable agreement. As
part of this proposal, the Comment will analyze the steps universities
need to take to ensure that their income-generating technology-
transfer activities conform with the Code's explicit and implied tax-
exemption requirements.
I. THE UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY PARTNERSHIP TODAY
A. Scope
Until recently, research universities22 considered the commer-
cialization of campus discoveries and inventions outside their mission
as teaching institutions.23 While it is doubtful that commercial
research has become so prominent as to be the primary focus of
university labs, statistics demonstrate that technology transfer and
patent licensing have become significant endeavors.24 The Associa-
tion of University Technology Managers ("AUTM") reported that in
1994 royalty revenues for nonprofit universities exceeded $265
million, compared with $1 million in 1980.25 The income generat-
ed by certain individual universities presents a more compelling
picture. M.I.T. received $4.56 million in royalty income in 1994,26
2 For purposes of this Comment, I will define the term "research university" as
those schools classified by the Carnegie Classification System as Research Universities
I and II, which are those institutions that offer a full range of baccalaureate programs,
provide graduate education through the doctoral degree and give high priority to
research. These schools also receive at least $12.5 million of support annually from
the federal government and award at least 50 Ph.D. degrees per year. See ERNEST L.
BOYER, THE CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, SCHOLARSHIP
RECONSIDERED: PRIORITIES OF THE PROFESSORIATE app. c at 129 (1990). While the
discussion is appropriate for all schools that engage in technology-transfer activities,
this Comment's analysis applies most directly to research universities.
2 Jeffrey Miller, an American geneticist at the University of Geneva, asserted that
using university laboratories simply to create private profits is "wrong, destructive, and
divisive.... What's a university want to be? If they have to save themselves by being
an arm of industry maybe they're not worth saving." MARTIN KENNEY, BIOTECHNOLO-
GY: THE UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 31 (1986) (citation omitted).
24 This Comment focuses primarily on technology-transfer arrangements involving
patent licensing. Patent licensing, however, is not the only mechanism for university-
industry scientific collaboration. Other collaborative efforts include research
contracts, joint ventures, venture capital funds, spinoff companies, jointly-owned
facilities and clinical trial agreements, to name just a few. Many of the same
arguments regarding taxability can be made about these arrangements.
I See AUTM SURVEY, supra note 7, at 27; Victoria Slind-Flor, The Trouble with
Techno-Transfers, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 3, 1994, at Al, A26.
26 See AUTM SURVEY, supra note 7, at 20.
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and, as University President Charles Vest explained in recent Senate
testimony, that income is especially attractive because, unlike
traditional grant income, its subsequent use is unrestricted."
Stanford University has garnered $23.5 million from its Cohen-Boyer
patent for recombinant DNA,28 and Michigan State University has
received $60 million from just one patent.29  Considering these
numbers in conjunction with the current applicable corporate tax
rate ranging from 15% to 35%V° reveals why the Service might take
an interest in reexamining the treatment of technology-transfer
income."1 Furthermore, overall revenues from royalties are expect-
ed to grow at a rate of 25% a year,3 2 making taxability consider-
ations all the more important for both the schools and the Service.
Evidence of the significance of technology-transfer activity for
major research universities goes beyond the dollars involved. The
potential income has also had a notable effect on the manner in
which universities conduct their research enterprises. Of sixty-five
schools surveyed, 75% had revised their patent policies since
1980"--20% from 1990 to 1993 34-- and most of these changes
were driven "'by a desire to promote technology transfer, or... to
increase royalty income."'35 Many universities have either estab-
27 See Tech Transfer Goal, supra note 12 (explaining why the current royalty system
should be kept intact and none of the proceeds should be shared with federal funding
agencies). Most federal grants and contracts are for specific projects; universities must
demonstrate that the monies were used in conformity with the grant's purpose. See,
e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 602.17(a)(1)-(4) (1996) (requiring progress reports, special reports
and a final report as part of a Department of Energy health-related research grant);
see a/soJos6 A. Cabranes, American Higher Education and the Law: Some Reflections on
NACUA's SilverAnniversary, 12J.C. & U.L. 261, 264 (1985-1986) ("The most significant
constraints on the institutional autonomy of most private universities may be the
conditions that the federal government attaches to its grants, loans and contracts.").
28 See Slind-Flor, supra note 25, at A27.
2 See Williams, supra note 2, at A26.
so See I.R.C. § 11 (b) (1) (C) (1994).
S" The IRS has, in fact, taken an interest in this activity. In 1993, the Service
proposed a series of guidelines for auditing universities, which included a section
specifically dealing with income from research activities. See Exempt Organizations;
Proposed Examination Guidelines Regarding Colleges and Universities, Announce-
ment 93-2, 1993-2 I.R.B. 39, 49-50 [hereinafter IRS Guidelines].
"2 See Bill Deener, To Protect and Defend: Med Schools "Wise Up" and Sell Patents,
DALLAS MORNING NEwS, Aug. 30, 1993, at 1D, available in 1993 WL 9283342 (tracing
the growth of university technology-transfer issues at Texas schools).
13 See Lynne J. Bowers & Vickie Leon, Patent Policies of 65 Educational Institutions:
A Comparison, Soc. RES. ADMIN. J., Spring 1994, at 5, 5.
34 See id.
11 Id. at 12 (quoting GARYW. MATKIN, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE UNIVERSITY
96 (1990) (examining the patent policies of various institutions to determine notable
19961
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lished or expanded technology-transfer offices to handle patent and
licensing matters on a full-time basis. The University of Texas
Medical School prints a catalog listing important discoveries available
for licensing. 6 The city of San Diego recently hosted a "technology
trade show" in which universities were given the opportunity to
showcase their latest marketable discoveries in a convention
format. 7
The consumer end of this relationship-the for-profit corpora-
tion-has been no less aggressive in its approach to unearthing what
the universities are offering. Some companies go so far as to send
representatives to college campuses to investigate research that might
prove useful.38 State governments have become involved as well,
creating university consortia designed to complement schools' efforts
to promote technology-transfer agreements. North Carolina's
Triangle University Licensing Consortium helped broker some 270
agreements between universities and the private sector, and New
York, California, Illinois, Kansas and Indiana all operate some form
of a state technology-transfer program. 9
An increase in related litigation is, arguably, the surest sign of the
importance of any legal development. University technology transfer
is no exception. The University of Pennsylvania," Johns Hopkins
University4' and the University of Colorado4 2 have each expended
prodigious sums to protect royalty rights. Furthermore, the
University of Arizona recently generated substantial media attention
by agreeing to settle a patent infringement suit for $1.95 million,
illustrating that the stakes are high in this arena.43
similarities and differences)). These changes included, for example, provisions for
universities to retain rights to inventions developed by faculty and staff. See id. at 9-10.
36 See Deener, supra note 32.
s See Craig D. Rose, Science Learns That There's Money to Be Made by Hawking
Technology, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 23, 1993, at C1, available in 1993 WL
7484374.
3 See Deener, supra note 32.
s See Norm Heikens, Technology Transfer Group Could Solve State Shortfall,
INDIANAPOLIs Bus.J., May 8, 1995, at 12A.
" See University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 762 F. Supp. 1212, 1229 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(denying defendants' motion for summary judgment in a suit by the University of
Pennsylvania against the professor-inventor and Johnson & Johnson to recover
royalties derived from Retin-A sales).
41 SeeJohns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, 894 F. Supp. 819, 822 (D. Del. 1995) (patent
infringement suit concerning bone marrow transplant technology).
42 See University of Colo. Found. v. American Cyanamid, 880 F. Supp. 1387, 1389
(D. Colo. 1995) (patent infringement suit concerning prescription prenatal vitamin).
41 See Paul Schneider, U.A.: Yes to Licensing No to Equity, ARIZ. Bus. GAZETTE, May
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It is important to note that success in technology-transfer
ventures is far from certain. An oft-quoted rule of thumb suggests
that of ten laboratory inventions, only one will receive a patent; only
one in ten patents will be licensed by a company, and only one in ten
licenses results in more than $25,000 per year in income. 44 Statis-
tics from the University of Wisconsin's technology-transfer office bear
this out: of 2751 discoveries by Wisconsin faculty, only seventy-three
produced income greater than expenses.45  Nonetheless, the
potential revenue obtainable from technology transfer clearly has a
powerful impact on the manner in which universities conduct their
research enterprise and structure their licensing agreements.
B. Reasons for the Recent Expansion in University-Corporate
Partnerships
Before engaging in an analysis of the Tax Code to determine
whether any (or all) technology-transfer income should be taxable,
it is first necessary to examine briefly the developments that created
such remarkable growth in licensing opportunities. Nearly all of the
relevant code sections and regulations were established before these
developments. Investigating these developments will be helpful in
evaluating how the Code, as written, may not be well-suited to deal
with the current situation. Also, an understanding of why this growth
has taken place further demonstrates how much universities and
corporations have at stake in maintaining their tax exemption.
1. The Bayh-Dole Act
Arguably the most important catalyst for the expansion of
university technology transfer was the enactment of the Bayh-Dole
Act of 1980.46 Before its passage, title to all discoveries or inven-
tions developed in whole or in part with federal funding reverted to
the federal government.47 Prior to 1980, more than two-thirds of
25, 1995, at 9, available in 1995 WL 5226003; see also Goldie Blumenstyk, Turning Off
Spinoffs, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 21, 1995, at A33.
'See Katherine Bouton, Academic Research and Big Business: A Delicate Balance, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 62, 123. (describing the $70 million
agreement between Hoechst A.G., a German chemical company, and Harvard
University to set up an institute of molecular biology).
"I See Pat K. Chew, FacultyhGenerated Inventions: Who Owns the Golden Egg?, 1992 Wis.
L. REV. 259, 272 n.54.
"Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3018 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 200-12 (1994)).
4 SeeBayh-DoleAct Encourages University Participation in Technology Development, EDUC.
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academic research was federally funded.48  Thus, the majority of
university-developed technologies became the property of the federal
government. Recognizing the drastic decline in U.S. corporate
expenditures for research and development in the late 1970s,
Congress sought to develop a mechanism whereby the wealth of
discoveries made on university campuses (and in other nonprofit
laboratories) could stimulate American industry.49 The Bayh-Dole
Act fundamentally altered the treatment of the university research
product. Under its language, a nonprofit organization may elect to
take title to inventions developed by its researchers.50 The ability
to "take title" affords universities the opportunity to license patented
or patentable technologies, and in most cases the school is entitled
to some negotiated share of the receipts generated by the commer-
cial product.
To say that the Bayh-Dole Act has achieved its goals would be an
understatement. Before passage, "fewer than 250 patents were issued
to universities annually."'" In 1992, there were 2,700 academic
patents filed and 1,500 licenses granted to industry by universities.
5 2
REC., Summer 1994, at 66, 66.
48 In 1970, 70.3% of college and university research was federally funded; by 1980,
67.1% was federally funded. See Byron V. Olson, Note, Rust in the Laboratory: Wen
Science Is Censored, 58 ALB. L. REv. 299, 313 (1994) (citing ECONOMICS & STATISTICS
ADMIN., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1993,
at 595-96 (113th ed. 1993).
49 See 35 U.S.C. § 200 (1994) ("It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use
the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally
supported research or development.... ."); H.R. REP. NO. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6461 (declaring that "the effective
commercialization of government financed research is becoming an ever more
important issue for those who are concerned with industrial innovation"); see also
William L. Geary, Jr., Protecting the Patent Rights of Small Businesses-Does the Bayh-Dole
Act Live Up to Its Promise, 20 AIPILA Q.J. 10, 16 (1992) ("Indeed, the stimulation of
a public need appears to be the impetus behind the enactment of both the SBIR
program and the Bayh-Dole Act."). But see H.R. REP. NO. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
31 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CA.N. 6460, 6489-90 (dissenting views of Hon.Jack
Brooks) (arguing that to base "[t]he policies and objectives of government funding
of research and development" on "the policies and practices followed by commercial
establishments... would change the direction of federal research and development
from a process of intellectual and technological innovation for the general welfare of
the people to one which emphasizes the profit incentive underlying commercialization
in the marketplace").
" 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1994) (stating that "[e]ach nonprofit organization... may,
within a reasonable time after disclosure ... elect to retain title to any subject
invention").




The results have been so financially impressive that Senator Dennis
DiConcini of Arizona has suggested allowing the federal government,
which provides much of the grant money that makes university
research possible, to share in the revenues generated from the sale
of licensed technology.53
2. Financial Pressures on Higher Education
While the primary intent behind the Bayh-Dole Act was to benefit
business and industry, an equally important consequence of the Act
was revenue enhancement for research universities. The need for
such enhancement has recently grown acute because the late 1980s
and 1990s have been marked by either a decline in growth or a
threatened absolute decline in revenues from traditional sources.
Federal funding has been curtailed in recent years,54 and the
current climate on Capitol Hill does not suggest a reversal of that
trend in the near future. State legislatures have made prodigious
cuts in expenditures for their public university systems; in 1992,
California slashed 10% of its education budget, and many other
states have acted similarly.5" While annual percentage tuition
increases were at or around double-digit figures throughout most of
the 1980s,5" such a level of growth cannot be sustained if colleges
are to maintain requisite enrollment levels and keep higher
education affordable for lower- and middle-income families. Finally,
on the expenditure side of the equation, the cost of operating a
research university has increased dramatically, due in no small part
to the enormous costs of purchasing and maintaining the type of
equipment necessary to conduct sophisticated modern research.
5 7
53 See id.
11 SeeBok, supra note 10, at 14 (noting the decline in growth of federal outlays and
its effect on the dynamism of the university); James S. Fairweather, Academic Research
and Instruction: The Industrial Connection, 60 J. HIGHER EDUC. 388, 393 (1989)
(documenting the reduction in funding and the effect on academic facilities and
laboratory equipment); Cary H. Sherman & Steven R. Englund, When theFeds Share the
Tab, LEGAL TIMES, May 15, 1995, Magazine Supplement, at 21, 22. (describing the
reasons universities are seeking additional research funding from industry).
11 See Christina Del Valle et al., A Lot Less Moola Moola on Campus, Bus. WEEK, Oct.
5, 1992, at 114, 114 (analyzing state funding for higher education).
11 See generally Why College Tuitions Are So High, ATLANTIC MONTHLYJ., Mar. 1993,
at 32 ("[S]ince 1980 colleges and universities have been increasing their tuition and
fees at roughly twice the rate of inflation."); Michael O'Keefe, College Costs: Have They
Gone Too High Too Fast?, CHANGE, May/June 1994, at 54, 54-55 (discussing the
tremendous increase in college costs from 1981-1987).
17 See Consuelo Lauda Kertz & James K. Hasson, Jr., University Research and
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Taking all these factors into consideration, it is clear that income
from technology transfer is not so much "found money," but rather
a necessary source of income to offset that which universities have
either already lost or are losing. Assuming a corporate tax rate
between 15% and 34% and the technology-transfer income levels de-
scribed in Part L.A, the application of the federal income tax would
result in a considerable loss of revenue to schools that are already
cash-strapped. Consequently, the exemption of income derived from
technology transfer is not a luxury; it is practically a necessity. 8
3. The Development of the Biotechnology
and Software Industries
Changes on the corporate/industry side have also contributed to
the remarkable expansion in technology-transfer opportunities. The
increase in licensing agreements has been contemporaneous with the
development of the biotechnology and computer software fields.
When automobile manufacturing and other heavy industrial
businesses dominated corporate America, university research
produced little that could be practically utilized. Now that bio-
medical and high-technology enterprises have established a powerful
presence in the U.S. and world economies, the possibilities for
academic collaboration have greatly increased. 9 Additionally, both
the federal and state governments have encouraged these collabora-
tions.
60
Development Activities: The Federal Income Tax Consequences of Research Contracts, Research
Subsidiaries andjoint Ventures, 13J.C. & U.L. 109, 109 (1986-1987) (including "the ever-
growing cost of research facilities and equipment" in a list of financial burdens on
universities).
" See Bok, supra note 10, at 18-19 ("There is no reason to suppose that these
pressures will diminish any time soon. On the contrary, massive federal deficits and
a sluggish economy are likely to make the financial outlook for academe even chillier
than in the past.").
" See Martin Kenney, The Ethical Dilemmas of University-Industry Collaborations, 6 J.
Bus. ETHICS 127, 130 (1987) (describing the onset of genetic engineering as one of
the major catalysts to university-industry collaborations).
60 See 15 U.S.C. § 3701(1), (3) (1994) (declaring that "[t] echnology and industrial
innovation are central to the economic, environmental, and social well-being of
citizens of the United States" and that "[clooperation among academia, Federal
laboratories, labor, and industry, in such forms as technology transfer, personnel
exchange, joint research projects, and others, should be renewed, expanded, and
strengthened"); see also Chew, supra note 45, at 271-72 (describing how both the
federal and state governments have legislated programs to encourage university
collaboration with business and specifically mentioning the University of Pennsyl-
vania's Ben Franklin Partnership Program, which advises and funds university-industry
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4. Faculty Impetus for Technology Transfer
Finally, one cannot ignore the tangible and intangible benefits
that professors and other researchers derive from seeing their work
put to practical use. First, researchers stand to make a personal
profit from commercially successful inventions and discoveries.
Generally, the professor-inventor receives a portion of the technolo-
gy-transfer revenue.61 The Bayh-Dole Act mandates that a professor-
inventor receive some share, albeit an indeterminate one, of the
royalties under agreements to which the Act applies. 2 Second,
technology-transfer successes often increase the personal satisfaction
of an academic in seeing a discovery realize a practical application.
As Elihu Thomson stated to the M.I.T. graduating class in 1920:
"Publish an invention freely, and it will almost surely die from lack
of interest in its development. It will not be developed and the
world will not be benefitted. Patent it, and it will be taken up and
developed into a business."63 Professors' personal motivations are
critical, not only because of their effect on the growth of technology
transfer, but also because they touch upon many of the issues
affecting the university tax exemption.
II. THE CURRENT TAX STRUCTURE FOR UNIVERSITIES AND INCOME
FROM LICENSED INVENTIONS
A. The § 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption
1. Generally
Under I.R.C. § 501 (a), an organization that is described under
§ 501(c) is granted an exemption from the income tax on corpo-
rations. Provided that an institution is both organized and operated
exclusively for one or more of the purposes listed in the section, it
will be classified as an exempt organization. 4 Section 501 (c) (3)
joint ventures).
61 See Bowers & Leon, supra note 33, at 9-10 (describing the rights of a professor-
inventor and the distribution of royalties). There is, however, considerable debate as
to whether the professor-inventor should be the outright owner of the invention. See,
e.g., Speck v. North Carolina Dairy Found., Inc., 319 S.E.2d 139, 144 (N.C. 1984)
(determining that professors did not acquire an interest in their invention of
acidophilus milk); Chew, supra note 45 (discussing whether universities or professors
should own research products).
62 See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c) (7) (B) (1994).
1 Bowers & Leon, supra note 33, at 7.
1 SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(a) (1) (as amended in 1990). Although the Code
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specifically exempts " [c] orporations ... organized. . . exclusively for
... charitable, scientific... or educational purposes. ,65 Since most
research universities engage in both scientific and educational activi-
ties,66 they qualify for exempt status, and consequently the majority
of their revenues are not subject to taxation.
The philosophy behind granting a tax exemption to institutions
organized for scientific, educational or other charitable purposes is
that their operation confers a public benefit on society." This
historic rationale 6 has been codified in the Treasury regulations,
which state that "[a]n organization is not organized or operated
exclusively for one or more of the purposes specified in subdivision
(i) of this subparagraph [which includes educational and scientific
purposes] unless it serves a public rather than a private interest."69
The exemption rests upon the concept that the government should
subsidize those enterprises that society values as a public good but
that the market might not create in the absence of government
support.70 However, it is questionable whether such a subsidy
mandates organization and operation exclusively for an exempt purpose, it is
permissible for some portion of an institution's revenue to be derived from activities
unrelated to the exemption. See St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d
427, 431-32 (8th Cir. 1967) (noting that, to qualify for exemption, an organization's
primary purpose must meet the Code's exclusivity requirement, but that the
performance of incidental activities that do not qualify for exempt status will not
automatically result in the loss of exempt status). Therefore, even if royalty income
were subject to taxation, it would present no threat to the general university
exemption.
65 I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) (1994).
66 See James T.Y. Yang, Collaboration Between Nonprofit Universities and Commercial
Enterprises: The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Universities from Federal Income Taxation,
95 YALE L.J. 1857, 1862 n.37 (1986) ("Research universities, in particular, will have
several bases for tax exemption, including charitable, educational, and scientific
purposes.").
" See Charles 0. Galvin & Neal Devins, A Tax Polity Analysis of Bob Jones University
v. United States, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1365-66 (1983) (noting that "[iun the floor
debate over the Tariff Act of 1894, which provided tax exemptions for organizations
'organized and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational purposes,'
Congress made clear that these tax benefits were available because the organizations
served desirable public purposes" (citations omitted)).
6' For a brief but enlightening discussion of the history of university tax
exemptions, see Colombo, supra note 19, at 844-45.
69 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1 (d) (1) (ii) (as amended in 1990) (emphasis added).
70 SeeYang, supra note 66, at 1864 ("'The exemption from taxation... is based on
the theory that the government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief
from financial burdens which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from




should be extended to activities that the market does support-a
point addressed in Part III.
The Supreme Court, in Bob Jones University v. United States,71 has
confirmed that a "public purpose" is the basis for the federal tax
exemption. ChiefJustice Burger, writing for the majority, explained
that "in enacting ... § 501(c) (3), Congress sought to provide tax
benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the development
of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose or supple-
ment or take the place of public institutions of the same kind."
72
He continued: "Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that
the exempt entity confers a public benefit-a benefit which the
society or the community may not itself choose or be able to provide,
or which supplements or advances the work of public institutions
already supported by tax revenues." 73 The concept of conferring a
"public benefit" is critical in determining whether a given activity of
an otherwise-exempt institution is inconsistent with its exempt public
purpose, and therefore should be subject to UBIT.74
Those within the academy have also recognized the centrality of
this public purpose. President Bok's final address to the Harvard
Board of Overseers explained:
Universities attract the loyalty of faculty and alumni and, to a
degree, the respect of the public precisely because they act for
reasons other than money and will not compromise certain values
to gain immediate monetary rewards. As universities grow more
aggressive in finding ways to turn their activities into cash, their
image subtly changes. They appear less and less as a charitable
institution seeking truth and serving students and more and more
as a huge commercial operation that differs from corporations only
because there are no shareholders and no dividends.75
Bok's recognition of the fragility of the public's acceptance of the
traditional tax exemption for universities is well-founded. Consider
the following:
According to the myth created by that traditional vision, scholars
pursue research wherever their drive to knowledge takes them, and
colleges and universities transmit the fruits of that research to
71 461 U.S. 574, 575 (1983) (determining that it would be incompatible with the
purpose of the § 501 (c) (3) exemption to allow a racially discriminatory private school
to enjoy the benefits of the tax exemption).
72 461 U.S. at 587-88.
73 461 U.S. at 591.
7 See infra Part II.B.
5 Bok, supra note 10, at 17-18.
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contemporary and future generations as the accumulated wisdom
of the ages.
... Institutions of higher education use the myth to justify a
tax-exempt status .... 76
These statements suggest that, if universities continue to engage in
activities that resemble commercial enterprises, their historical
exemption from corporate taxation may be called into question.
While this Comment does not call for the revocation of the overall
exemption granted to universities, the applicability of UBIT to
technology-transfer activities draws analogously upon this criticism of
university activity.
2. Educational and Scientific Organizations
a. Educational
Precisely what is the public function of a research university such
that its income deserves exemption from taxation under I.R.C.
§ 501 (a)? The answer to this question lies in the Treasury regula-
tions' definitions of "educational" and "scientific." An educational
institution is one that engages in "[t] he instruction or training of the
individual for the purpose of improving or developing his capabili-
ties" or "[tihe instruction of the public on subjects useful to the
individual and beneficial to the community." 7  Therefore, the
concept that both enrolled students and the taxpaying public will
gain a tangible benefit from colleges and universities grounds the
exemption for educational institutions. When an otherwise-exempt
university chooses to engage in revenue-producing activities that
neither provide a benefit to enrolled students nor instruct the public,
the public-function element is missing. As will be discussed in Part
III, orienting the university research enterprise in a manner that
6 Robison & Sanders, supra note 13, at 227.
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (3) (i) (a), (b) (as amended in 1990). In 1980, a
federal court of appeals found portions of this regulation to be unconstitutionally
vague. See Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F2d 1030, 1034-35 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (finding the Regulation's definition of "educational" to be "so vague as to
violate the First Amendment and to defy [the court's] attempts to review its
application in this case"), cited in HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 177. This regulation,
however, is still part of Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations and is still utilized
by the courts and the Service. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729, 729
(considering the result in Big Mama Rag Inc. and determining "the circumstances
under which advocacy of a particular viewpoint or position by an organization is




encourages technology transfer has arguably had a negative impact
on the educational mission of the university.
b. Scientific
A research university could also qualify for the § 501 (c) (3) tax
exemption as a "scientific" organization, 8 with the word "scientific"
again having a specific meaning under the Treasury regulations.
First, because an organization only meets the requirements of the
§ 501(c) (3) exemption if it serves a public purpose, "a scientific
organization must be organized and operated in the public interest
.... Therefore, the term scientific, as used in section 501 (c) (3),
includes the carrying on of scientific research in the public inter-
est."79 The Treasury regulations go on to define precisely what
constitutes the public interest for tax-exemption purposes under the
scientific prong: First, if the results of the research are made
available to the public on a nondiscriminatory basis; second, if the
research is performed for the United States or other political
subdivision; or third, if the research is directed toward benefiting the
public.8"
The regulations elaborate further upon exactly what constitutes
"[s]cientific research ... benefiting the public."8" The definition
of scientific research carried on in the public interest includes: (1)
the scientific education of college or university students; (2)
publication in a treatise, thesis or trade publication; (3) research
carried on for the purpose of discovering a cure for a disease; and
(4) research oriented toward the development of a geographic
area.82 As will be discussed in Part III, much of the technology-
transfer royalty income that is currently designated as tax-exempt is
generated from research endeavors that satisfy neither the statutory
nor the regulatory criteria.
The other term in the regulations that takes on special meaning
for purposes of determining the tax-exempt status of scientific
activities is the word "research." Not all activities that are commonly
thought of as research qualify for the tax exemption. First, the
regulations explain that "[s]cientific research does not include
"' See Kertz & Hasson, supra note 57, at 115 (including "scientific" among a
university's exempt purposes).
79 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-l(d) (5) (i) (as amended in 1990).
' See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-l(d) (5) (iii) (a) to (c) (as amended in 1990).
81 Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1(d) (5) (iii) (c) (as amended in 1990).
82 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(5)(iii)(c)(1) to (4) (as amended in 1990).
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activities of a type ordinarily carried on as an incident to commercial
or industrial operations."83  The regulations, however, do not
categorically exclude all research in furtherance of a commercial
purpose, or that might ultimately prove to have commercial value, as
they state "[t]he determination as to whether research is scientific
does not depend on whether such research is classified as fundamen-
tal or basic as contrasted with applied or practical."84  Therefore,
research that is geared toward applied or practical ends is not per se
taxable. Since the type of research performed is not determinative
for taxability purposes, 85 the proper inquiry as to whether income
from scientific research should be exempt from taxation must focus
on whether the particular research is performed for the "public
benefit" as defined by the Code and regulations.
86
3. The Private Benefit Rule
The other aspect of the § 501(c) (3) exemption that requires
consideration in terms of the potential taxability of technology-
transfer income is the private benefit rule. The Code mandates that
in order to qualify for exempt status, no part of the net earnings of
83 Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (d) (5) (ii) (as amended in 1990) (emphasis added).
This regulation is often invoked when an exempt organization engages in products-
testing activities. See Rev. Rul. 85-110, 1985-2 C.B. 166, 168 (finding that diagnostic
laboratory testing by a tax-exempt hospital of specimens from private patients of the
hospital's staff constituted an unrelated trade or business if such testing was otherwise
available in the community); Rev. Rul. 68-373, 1968-2 C.B. 206, 207 (determining that
a nonprofit organization that tested drugs for commercial drug companies was not
entitled to exemption under § 501(c) (3)); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-52-007 (Sept. 13, 1978)
(determining that the testing of dental specimens and hydraulic and mechanical
devices was not scientific research and therefore the income received for these
activities was not exempt from taxation); see also infra note 116.
84 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(d)(5)(i) (as amended in 1990).
' This is the case provided that the institution is not operated merely as an
adjunct to a for-profit enterprise. SeeTreas. Reg. 1.501 (c) (3)-l (d) (5) (ii) (as amended
in 1990) ("Scientific research does not include activities of a type ordinarily carried
on as an incident to commercial or industrial operations. .. ").
86 Seesupranotes 67 & 71-74 and accompanying text (delineating the requirements
for an organization to qualify for "educational" or "scientific" tax exemption).
It can be argued that the development of commercial products does benefit the
public by increasing the overall welfare of a market economy. Under this conception,
however, all corporate activity would be tax exempt, since corporate research products
are no different from university research products in terms of potential economic
benefit. See infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text (arguing that university
activities that are identical to commercial enterprises should not be tax-exempt).




an organization may inure to the benefit of a private individual.
This private inurement rule "refers to a situation in which the
[exempt] entity's economic benefits are diverted from the charitable
class the entity is supposed to serve and into the hands of 'insiders'
such as officers, directors, employees and the like.""8  Faculty
researchers are often able to supplement their salaries through a
contracted-for share of subsequent licensing, royalty and other
technology-transfer income. 9 In fact, the Bayh-Dole Act requires
that if a university intends to take title to and license an invention,
the professor-inventor must receive some portion of the proceeds.9 °
An issue that has arisen over the last several years is whether
compensation in the university might reach a level such that the
Service would characterize it as unreasonable and therefore tax-
able. 1 What constitutes "unreasonable compensation" is still an
open question, as the Service has no "definitive instruction to
determine when compensation is unreasonable."92 One could
certainly envision a private benefit inquiry, however, if the Service
were to determine that the compensation of the professoriate so
closely resembled that of researchers in the private sector that there
existed no discernible difference between the compensation of, for
example, a Harvard professor and a for-profit researcher. If
technology-transfer growth were to result in such identical compen-
sation levels, the Service might find a violation of the private benefit
rule and potentially could revoke the school's general tax-exempt
status.93
87 See I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) (1994).
83 Colombo, supra note 19, at 850 (citing BORIS I. BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 100.4 (2d ed. 1992)).
s1 Seesupranotes 61-63 and accompanying text (discussing incentive compensation
for professor-inventors).
90 See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c) (7) (B) (1994) (requiring the contractor [university] to
share royalties with the inventor [professor]). The courts, however, have recently
determined that the provision requiring a sharing of royalty income does not create
a private right of action for a researcher to sue her university or research facility. See
Gen-Probe Inc. v. Center for Neurologic Study, 853 F. Supp. 1215, 1217-18 (S.D. Cal.
1993); Platzer v. Sloan-Kettering Inst. for Cancer Research, 787 F. Supp. 360, 365
(S.D.N.. 1992).
"' See Bertrand M. Harding, Jr. & Edgar D. McClellan, Unreasonable Compensation:
The Hidden Issue in the IRS College and University Examination Guidelines, 20 J.C. & U.L.
111, 113 (1993-1994) (describing the emergence of the unreasonable-compensation
issue).
92 Id. at 114.
11 See Harding & McClellan, supra note 91, at 114-15 (explaining that "the only
sanction that can be imposed against a college or university (or any other tax-exempt
organization) that has paid unreasonable compensation ... is to revoke the
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The recently proposed IRS auditing guidelines for universities 94
suggest that the Service is seriously considering the private benefit
question in regard to scientific research income. As a report on the
guidelines determined, "[t]he main focus of the research section of
the guidelines is whether the conduct of a research activity by a
college or a university may result in impermissible private benefit.
9 5
If the Service determined that a professor's share of royalty income
constituted a private benefit similar to that received in a commercial
setting, it might also determine that the initial research generating
such income was not "scientific research" within the § 501 (c) (3)
exemption. This might consequently create UBIT problems for the
professor's institution on its share of the royalty income.96
B. The Doctrine of Unrelated Business Income
1. Generally
The income tax exemption for organizations that qualify under
§ 501 (c) (3) does not automatically exempt income derived from all
activities in which such organizations may participate. If a university
(or any exempt organization) engages in activities that are unrelated
to the charitable purposes for which the initial tax exemption was
granted, the Service will impose the appropriate corporate income
tax through the unrelated business income tax ("UBIT"). 9' The
most commonly recognized purpose of UBIT is to place for-profit
and nonprofit organizations on the same footing when they are
engaging in the same activities. 98
institution's tax-exempt status").
94 See IRS Guidelines, supra note 31.
9 Robert Louthian & Robert Harper, The College and University Examination
Guidelines, 94 TAx NoTEs TODAY 71-38 (Apr. 13, 1994), available in LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, Tnt File.
96 The professor-researcher will pay personal income taxes on her share of the
royalty income no matter how the Service ultimately characterizes the research for
UBIT purposes. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (6) (1994) (designating royalties as gross income).
97 See I.R.C. § 511(a)(1) (1994). The Code also indicates that UBIT applies to
public universities as well as private institutions. See I.R.G. § 511(a) (2) (B) (1994).
" See Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax,
75 VA. L. REV. 605, 607 (1989) (acknowledging that the debate over UBIT has most
often been cast in terms of fairness but asserting that "the more basic issues concern
economic efficiency"). Other recent scholarship, however, has questioned the
assumption that UBIT places both entities on the same level, arguing that "the tax on
unrelated business activity creates more unfairness than it can possibly prevent."
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 1017, 1038 (1982).
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One of the most well-known applications of UBIT in the
university setting occurred in Iowa State University of Science and
Technology v. United States.99 In that case, Iowa State University
operated a revenue-generating television station affiliated with the
American Broadcasting Corporation."' Only 14% of the station's
programming was "educational"; the balance consisted of network
and syndicated programming."' The Court of Claims noted that
"[t]he presence of an income tax exemption for the University,
however, does not automatically exempt all activities in which it may
participate."102 While the court recognized that the station may
have provided some educational benefits, it ultimately concluded that
"the commercial aspects and the emphasis on revenue maximization
were the overwhelming goals of the operation of the station; and,
thus, the business was not substantially related to the educational
purposes of the University."103 The court held the station to be an
unrelated trade or business of the university and its income taxable
under UBIT.' 4
Higher education's attempt to find collateral sources of income
by engaging in activities that are arguably unrelated to its educational
or scientific purpose has generated considerable media attention. 05
No single source of income has been more hotly debated than the
revenues-still largely tax-exempt--derived from participation in
99 500 F.2d 508 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
... See id. at 511.
101 See id. at 515.
102 Id. at 516.
103 Id. at 520.
"I See id. But see C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir.
1951) (holding that income accruing to the New York University Law School from the
manufacture and sale of macaroni products was exempt from taxation). It was in
response to perceived abuses such as the N.Y.U. macaroni factory that the IRS decided
to tax income from the unrelated activities of otherwise-exempt entities. For a
discussion of the genesis of UBIT, see Note, The Macaroni Monopoly: The Developing
Concept of Unrelated Business Income of Exempt Organizations, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1280,
1280-85 (1968).
105 See, e.g., Battling "Nonprofits" for Profit: New Tax Proposals Aim at Curbing
Commercial Activity, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16, 1989, § 8 (Business), at 14, available in 1989
WL 4577529 (listing areas where nonprofits compete with commercial businesses,
including food service, testing laboratories, travel services, day care, medical
equipment supplies and bus operations); Edward B. Fiske, Competition in Business Pits
Town Versus Gown, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1987, at A12 (noting that four states have
already enacted laws limiting the commercial activities of colleges, and that similar
bills are pending in at least 30 other states); Gaul & Borowski, supra note 16, at A6
(noting that some schools have expanded the definition of "education" to include
such commercial activities as catering, trips abroad, executive seminars and video
sales).
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major college athletics." 6 The Service has recently ruled on other,
less high-profile revenue sources. Income from the rental of
university facilities to outside parties has been declared taxable,
10 7
as has income from university operation of hotels and motels.0 8
Income from university-operated parking lots'09  and travel
tours,"0 on the other hand, has been declared exempt. Some of
these dispositions, however, were "easy cases" in the sense that the
activity had only the most attenuated relationship to an educational
or other charitable purpose. Furthermore, the amount of money
generated by these activities is not so great that the institution
sustains a tremendous loss from being subject to taxation. Making
a determination on research income, however, does not present an
easy resolution, because an obvious relationship exists between the
activity and the university's exempt purposes, and the amount of
money at issue is considerable for both the institution and the
Service.
2. UBIT Explained
Internal Revenue Code § 512(a) (1) provides the definition of
unrelated business taxable income: "[T] he term 'unrelated business
taxable income' means the gross income derived by any organization
from any unrelated trade or business ... regularly carried on by it
.... ,"' Section 513(a) then proceeds to define the term "unrelat-
ed trade or business" as "any trade or business the conduct of which is
not substantially related ... to the exercise or performance by such
... See Richard L. Kaplan, Intercollegiate Athletics and the Unrelated Business Income Tax,
80 COLUM. L. REv. 1430, 1471 (1980) (noting that "a great many athletic programs
probably do have the characteristics of an 'unrelated trade or business'"); Ed
Sherman, College Sports Face Tax, Antitrust Peril: IRS, FTC Could Cause Upheaval, CHI.
TRIB., July 9, 1991, § 4, at 1 (noting that "recent actions by the IRS and FTG suggest
that athletic departments have crossed the fine line from existing for educational
purposes to being.., commercial enterprises").
107 See Rev. Rul. 80-298, 1980-2 C.B. 197, 198 (determining that a university that
leased its stadium to a professional football team was engaged in an unrelated trade
or business because the activity did not have a substantial causal relationship to the
achievement of the university's exempt purpose).
'0' See Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,060 (Aug. 22, 1979) (disagreeing with a proposed
revenue ruling and concluding that the operation of a hotel and restaurant constitutes
an unrelated trade or business).
109 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,825 (Aug. 17, 1990) (concluding that the receipt of
revenues from a parking lot does not constitute "rent").
"1 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,949 (Jan. 6, 1983) (concluding that the sponsorship
of travel study tours furthered the educational purpose of a museum).
' I.R.C. § 512(a) (1) (1994).
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organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or
function constituting the basis for its exemption under section
501."'112 Therefore, the determination whether a research endeavor
is substantially related to the exempt purpose of the university lies at
the heart of the inquiry as to whether subsequent income generated
by the project should be taxable. As will be discussed in Part III, if
research subject to a technology-transfer agreement is never
published, cannot be disclosed to other professors, does not provide
an educational benefit to students, creates conflicts of interest and
otherwise is damaging to the concept of academic freedom, the
Service should treat income from such research as taxable.
At this juncture, it is important to examine briefly the three main
elements of the Code's definition of an unrelated trade or business:
(1) a trade or business; (2) regularly carried on; (3) having no
substantial relation to the exempt purpose.'
13
a. Trade or Business
It is assumed that exempt organizations perform a public
function that otherwise would not be carried on in the for-profit
sector."4 The "trade or business" prong of the unrelated business
income test ensures that exempt organizations do not use this
exemption in pursuance of activities that are being performed by the
commercial sector, which must price its services to include the
additional cost of taxation. The relevant Treasury Regulation states
that "[t]he primary objective of adoption of the unrelated business
income tax was to eliminate a source of unfair competition by
placing the unrelated business activities of certain exempt organiza-
tions upon the same tax basis as the nonexempt business endeavors
with which they compete."'' 5 In the context of research activities,
this element of UBIT has most often been cited when a university or
other nonprofit research institute is acting in a products-testing
112 I.R.C. § 513(a) (emphasis added).
1 See I.R.C. §§ 512(a)(1), 513(a); see also Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States,
650 F.2d 1178, 1185 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (listing the three requirements).
14 See Colombo, supra note 19, at 861-62 (noting that institutions should receive
a tax exemption when they perform a function that society should support, but which
is not supported by the private market); see also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
115 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (as amended in 1983); see also Disabled American
Veterans, 650 F.2d at 1187 ("It is concluded that what is necessary to constitute a trade
or business for UBIT purposes is that an activity be operated in a competitive
commercial manner.").
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capacity similar or identical to a commercial lab, giving the nonprofit
organization an unfair advantage over competitors.
1 6
It is debatable whether technology-transfer activity constitutes a
true trade or business. On the one hand, it can be argued that it
does not, in that many of the discoveries that lead to patents, licenses
and revenue-generating arrangements are made in the course of
research that would be conducted whether or not the university had
a financial interest in its results. Inventions and discoveries are the
normal byproducts of a successful academic research enterprise. As
will be discussed in Part III, however, university interest in research
with profit potential is fundamentally changing the mode of
operation of the university laboratory. An increased focus on "the
bottom line" encourages faculty to orient efforts toward projects that
may generate pecuniary rewards," 7 just like a commercial enter-
prise. If the difference between the two evaporates because the
university ignores its public function, the unfair competition problem
that UBIT was enacted to address becomes even more important.
b. Regularly Carried On
The requirement that a trade or business be "regularly carried
on" calls for an inquiry into the frequency and continuity of
engagement in a given activity, as well as the manner in which the
activity is pursued." 8 Similar to the "trade or business" require-
ment, this element is designed to ensure that exempt organizations
are treated in the same manner as nonexempt organizations when
the two engage in similar activities. The Treasury regulations define
activities as being regularly carried on if they "manifest a frequency
and continuity, and are pursued in a manner, generally similar to
comparable commercial activities of nonexempt organizations.""
9
For example, in Disabled American Veterans v. United States, the Court
116 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-52-007 (Sept. 13, 1978), available in 1978 WL 7852007
(determining that the testing of oral pathology specimens was a trade or business and
that it constituted research normally carried on as a part of a commercial operation);
see also Kertz, supra note 18, at 81 ("Colleges, universities and hospitals are taxed on
income from ordinary 'testing' of materials or products."); Gaul & Borowski, supra
note 16, at A6 (noting that there is an unfair advantage in having testing performed
by university labs since for-profit organizations have to pay taxes and nonprofit
organizations do not).
17 See infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text (discussing university decisions
that allow professor-inventors to focus on lucrative research).




of Claims considered whether Disabled American Veterans' ("DAy")
semiannual Special Solicitation letters constituted an activity
"regularly carried on." 2' In concluding that the "regularly carried
on" test was satisfied, the court compared DAV's mailings to the
commercial direct-mail business.'
2'
The fact that a nonprofit institute frequently engages in for-profit
activities, however, does not necessarily trigger the "regularly carried
on" test. In Midwest Research Institute v. United States,122 the Western
District of Missouri determined that although the Institute performed
many revenue-generating research projects, each was a "discrete
activity taking place over a discrete period of time," and therefore
did not generally rise to the level of a trade or business. 1 3 The
court did conclude, however, that certain research projects of the
Institute-those that were conducted for private sponsors-did satisfy
the "regularly carried on" element of I.R.C. § 512.124 The court
found that "[p]laintiff conducted some types of projects.., so as to
satisfy the 'regularly carried on' requirement of § 512. These groups
of similar, regularly conducted projects may be regarded, in our view,
as trades or businesses for purposes of the unrelated-business
tax. 9 125 Midwest Research Institute, therefore, appears to leave open
the question whether university technology-transfer activity satisfies
the "regularly carried on" test. Some commentators presume that
the test would be satisfied. 26 Even if the activities were not ulti-
mately characterized as regularly carried on, Midwest Research Institute
suggests that individual projects may be analyzed on a case-by-case
basis for taxability, with the critical difference being the manner in
which the research endeavors are conducted.
127
120 650 F.2d 1178, 1188 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
121 See id. (concluding that "there exists sufficient similarity to a commercial
endeavor to conclude that the activity was regularly carried on").
" 554 F. Supp. 1379 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
'23 Id. at 1384.
124 See id. at 1385 ("[P]laintiff's private sponsor projects were, with exceptions to be
noted, scientific research carried on for the required purpose." (emphasis in
original)).
125 Id.
126 See Kertz, supra note 18, at 76-77 (assuming that most university research would
be considered to be a business "regularly carried on" if it were conducted by a
commercial enterprise).
'2 See Midwest Research Inst., 554 F. Supp. at 1385 ("[P]rojects must be examined
to determine whether the total satisfies the requirements of the statute.").
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c. No Substantial Relation to Exempt Purpose
University technology-transfer activities are most likely to be
found suspect if they fail to manifest a substantial relation to an
exempt purpose. If the Service does not consider the purpose or
conduct of an activity to be substantially related to the § 501(c) (3)
exempt purposes of a university-as in the operation of a network
television station or a hotel-the income derived will be subject to
the § 511 unrelated business income tax. 2 '
First, it is necessary to determine exactly how the Service
interprets the term "substantial relation." The corresponding
Treasury regulations provide some assistance, but are inconclusive:
"The presence of this requirement necessitates an examination of the
relationship between the business activities which generate the
particular income in question ... and the accomplishment of the
organization's exempt purposes."129 This statement requires a fact-
specific examination of the activity in question to determine its
relationship to the organization's exempt purpose. ° Furthermore,
the Treasury regulations note that the activity must have a causal
relationship with the achievement of exempt purposes and that the
causal relationship must be a substantial one.'' This means that an
attempt by a university to offer some merely attenuated relationship
between the activity that generated the income and the original
exempt purpose of the institution will likely be unsuccessful.
Finally, the UBIT regulations call for an inquiry into the overall
scope of the activities: "In determining whether activities contribute
importantly to the accomplishment of an exempt purpose, the size
and extent of the activities involved must be considered in relation
to the nature and extent of the exempt function which they purport
to serve."' 2 Consequently, if the extent (or degree) to which the
11 See, e.g., Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst. v. Commissioner, 732 F.2d 1058, 1059 (2d
Cir. 1984) (explaining that "the net income from commercial use of the fieldhouse
constituted 'unrelated business taxable income' which was subject to taxation under
I.R.C. § 511 (a) (1)"); Iowa State Univ. of Sci. and Tech. v. United States, 500 F.2d 508,
516 (Ct. C1. 1974) (holding that revenues from the operation of a university-owned
television station were unrelated business income).
12 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d) (1) (as amended in 1983).
ISO See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-36-006 (May 23, 1979) (determining that, although
the university was engaged in the testing of pharmaceutical products, the fact that the
results were published in scholarlyjournals and presented at conferences related the
activity to the exempt purposes of the university ald rendered income from the
activity nontaxable).
"I See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d) (2) (as amended in 1983).
112 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d) (3) (as amended in 1983).
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suspect activity is carried on is greater than that which is necessary
either for the education of students, the dissemination of knowledge
beneficial to the public or some other public function, the resultant
income may be classified as unrelated to the exempt purpose and
thus taxable.
3. 11T Research Institute v. United States'33
The seminal case in support of the proposition that income from
scientific research does not constitute unrelated trade or business
income, provided that such research is related to an institution's
exempt purpose, is lIT Research Institute v. United States.134 While
this case involved a research institute instead of a university and
while most of the revenue at issue was derived from research
contracts rather than licensing and royalty proceeds, the court's
holding is still illustrative. The Claims Court utilized the three-prong
test for defining unrelated business income for an otherwise tax-
exempt institution. It analyzed whether the income was from a trade
or business, whether that trade or business was regularly carried on
by the organization and whether the trade or business was or was not
substantially related to the original exempt purpose of the organiza-
tion.135 Because IIT was claiming its exemption as a scientific
organization, the court announced a working definition of the word
"scientific" in order to characterize the original exempt purpose of
the Institute."3 6 Having determined that IIT's research contracts
were "scientific" in nature,13 7 the court stated that, in order for the
research to qualify as "carried on in the public interest," the Institute
133 9 CL. Ct. 13 (1985).
134 For a related analysis, see Midwest Research Inst. v. United States, 544 F. Supp.
1379, 1391 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (determining that research performed for the purpose
of aiding industrial development is substantially related to a public purpose such that
income from the research is tax-exempt).
s See =IT Research Inst., 9 Cl. Ct. at 18 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 (a) (as amended
in 1983)).
... See id. at 21. The court defined research as "scientific" if it:
1) involved the use of observation or experimentation to formulate or verify
facts or natural laws; 2) could only have been performed by an individual
with advanced scientific or technical expertise; 3) added to knowledge
within a particular scientific field; 4) involved the application of mathemati-
cal reasoning; and/or, 5) was an attempt to systematize or classify a body of
scientific knowledge by collecting information and presenting it in a useful
form.
"I See id. at 21-25.
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was required either to make the results of the research available to
the public on a nondiscriminatory basis, to perform the research for
the United States government or a state government, or otherwise to
direct the research toward "benefiting the public."'38  The court
noted that the publication of results was "'a way of life"' for the
Institute and that therefore the research was made available to the
public on a nondiscriminatory basis."9 The court held that IIT
"ha[d] not engaged in a trade or business substantially unrelated to
its organization and operation for scientific purposes."140 In
considering whether income derived from university patent-licensing
activities should be classified as unrelated business income, courts
would likely perform an analysis similar to that used in IT Research
Institute. This analysis will be explained in greater detail in Part III
of this Comment.
C. Relevant Exceptions to the Tax on Unrelated Business Income
1. Research Performed for Any Person
While the case for the taxability of research income derived from
patent licensing appears plausible in cases in which the research
enterprise is not in conformity with the original exempt purpose of
the university, two notable exceptions within the Code still place the
income out of the reach of the IRS. The first is contained in I.R.C.
§ 512(b) (8), which states that "[i]n the case of a college, university,
or hospital, there shall be excluded all income derived from research
performed for any person . . . ."" This exception would appear
" Id. at 25-26 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1(d) (5) (as amended in 1990)).
The court, relying upon Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(5)(c)(1) to (3), described
research directed toward "benefiting the public" to include: aiding in the education
of students; publishing research results in any form available to the public; seeking
a cure for disease; and aiding in the addition, retention or development of new
industry in a community or geographical area. See id. at 26.
"' See IT Research Inst., 9 Cl. Ct. at 26 ("In practice, substantially all of the
information derived from scientific research is published or made available to the
public through presentations at research conferences and symposia."). The court also
noted that IIT had acted in accordance with Rev. Rul. 76-296, see id. at 26-27, which
requires the publication of "substantially all of the information concerning the results
of the research which would be useful or beneficial to the interested public," 1976-2
C.B. 142, 142.
140 See 1IT Research Inst., 9 Cl. Ct. at 31.
141 I.R.C. § 512(b) (8) (1994). "Person," used in the Treasury regulations, refers
to any legal entity, which includes individuals, corporations and the like. See I.R.C.
§ 7701(a) (1) (1994) ("The term 'person' shall be construed to mean and include an
individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.").
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to be an ironclad exemption for most university research income, no
matter how attenuated the relationship between the research and the
original rationale behind the tax exemption."' The Service's view
of the legislative intent behind this exemption, however, compels a
different conclusion.
In General Counsel Memorandum 39,196, the Service opined
that "Congress, in excluding university research from taxation
anticipated that the purpose of such research ... would be related to the
primary exempt purpose of a university (i.e., teaching students).
143
Congress was, through the inclusion of § 512 (b) (8), operating under
the then-valid assumption that a university would only engage in
research oriented toward exempt purposes.14 At least one analysis
of this General Counsel Memorandum has contended that the
opposite assumption-that Congress was unconcerned with whether
research was related to an exempt function-would contravene
congressional intent. 45 Therefore, the plain meaning of § 512(b)-
(8) may not be dispositive as to whether royalty income earned by a
university will be taxable. If the purpose for and/or the conduct of
the research enterprise fail to reflect either the scientific or
educational purposes that underlie the university's tax exempt
mission, the "for any person" exemption may be unavailable.
Another commentator has described the "for any person" exemption
as "inconsistent even with the Code's vague purpose of exemp-
tion."146 The presence of the § 512(b) (8) exemption was predicat-
4 See Kertz, supra note 18, at 79-80 (asserting that "Congress intended for income
from even 'unrelated' research to be exempt from tax in the case of a college [or]
university"); see also Exempt Organizations Handbook [Handbook 7751], in 4 IRS
Manual-Administration (CCH), pt. VII, ch. (37)89-(4), at 20,777-3 (1988) [hereinafter
Exempt Organizations Handbook] ("Under this provision, income from research
conducted by a college, university, or hospital will not be subject to tax on unrelated
business income, regardless of whether the research activities further an exempt
purpose of such organization.").
" Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,196 (Mar. 20, 1984), [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] IRS
Pos. (CCH) 1436, at 4599 (emphasis added).
" See id. (explaining that private contracts that concerned research endeavors did
not have to be separated out on the basis of those that would be subject to UBIT and
those that would not).
" See Louthian & Harper, supra note 95 ("This was not a result that Congress
could have intended."). This is especially true given the fact that Congress could not
have anticipated the changes in the university environment outlined in Part I of this
Comment.
'46 Yang, supra note 66, at 1873. Yang notes two grounds of inconsistency: "First,
the singular requirement that research cannot be incident to commercial or industrial
operations exempts from taxation research that is not 'carried on in the public
interest.' Second, the modifications exempt income generated by 'unrelated'
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ed on a particular vision of the university's research enterprise. As
the manner in which research universities conduct that enterprise
changes (based on the promise of technology-transfer revenue) ,47
a reconsideration of that subsection becomes more appropriate.
2. Royalty Revenues
The other relevant Code exclusion from the unrelated business
income tax concerns royalty income. I.R.C. § 512(b) (2) excludes "all
royalties... whether measured by production or by gross or taxable
income.1 48 One would assume, therefore, that universities should
not be concerned about technology-transfer income when the source
of the revenue is from royalty payments.1 49  Revenue Ruling 76-
297150 addressed this Code subsection directly. The question for
the Service was whether amounts received by an otherwise-exempt
organization pursuant to a licensing agreement constituted royalty
income that was excludable in computing unrelated business taxable
income. The Service determined that such income was excludable
under § 512(b) (2)."M
The Service is currently embroiled in a controversy over the
royalty exemption, the outcome of which may be dispositive of
the patent-licensing income issue. In Sierra Club, Inc. v. Commissioner
the Tax Court held that income derived from "affinity" credit cards
was exempt from UBIT because it constituted a royalty under
§ 512(b) (2).52 The Service, naturally, had argued against exemp-
tion.155 The result of Sierra Club would appear to be the death
research." Id. at 1873-74.
147 See infra Part III.
141 I.R.C. § 512(b) (2) (1994).
14 See Kertz, supra note 18, at 78 (noting that § 512(b) excludes interest,
dividends, rents and royalties from UBIT even when these items are unrelated to
exempt functions); see also Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178,
1189 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (explaining that royalties received by a patent licensor from a
patent licensee are the type of "passive" income that § 512(b) was meant to exclude
from taxation).
'10 1976-2 C.B. 178.
'51 See id. at 179.
152 103 T.C. 307, 344 (1994). An "affinity" credit card arrangement results when
an organization enters into an agreement with a credit card provider allowing and
encouraging the solicitation of the organization's members. The credit card provider
pays the organization a percentage of the monthly sales volume resulting from
transactions made with the cards. SeeJames S. Halpern, Sierra Club Wins Again; Income
from "Affinity Card"Is Not UBTI, But Exempt Royalties, 64 TAX NOTES 1181, 1181 (Aug.
29, 1994).
'53 See Sierra Club, 103 T.C. at 321.
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knell for UBIT, since credit card services are clearly commercial
ventures that have nothing to do with the exempt purposes of the
Sierra Club. Recently, the Service has attempted to rectify this
situation by attempting to redraw the line between passive and active
royalty income. As one commentator has noted, "the IRS has argued
that 'active' really means that the organization is energetically
engaged in business activities and merely calls its return, derived
from a joint venture or agency relationship, a royalty."'54 This issue
has not yet been resolved; an affirmation of Sierra Club on appeal
would create a circuit split that may ultimately be resolved by the
Supreme Court.'55 Therefore, the ability of universities to utilize
the royalty exception to UBIT may be seriously in doubt; technology-
transfer royalties could fall into the redefined "active" category, given
how universities and professors are gearing the university research
enterprise to maximize income at the expense of educational,
scientific and charitable purposes.'56
In addition to this argument, there is also a strong argument that
the royalty exception to UBIT should be conditioned upon the
activity that generated the revenue. One commentator, responding
to the Sierra Club decision, has suggested an accountability-focused
approach to the royalty exception.' 57 Under this approach, non-
profit organizations must be held accountable to the public for the
subsidy provided by tax-exempt status; otherwise, the organization
"violates its agreement with the public to undertake activities related
to its exempt purpose in exchange for exemption from taxation."158
When the organization fails to further an exempt purpose, "it should
be made to account for the misuse of the subsidy by paying a
tax.""'59 This resolution of the Sierra Club UBIT-royalty-exception
problem is consistent with the argument advanced in Part III of this
Comment: In order for a university to benefit from the royalty
exception to UBIT, the research endeavor that generated the
11 Paul Streckfus, Sierra Club: Latest Nail in the UBIT Coffin, 64 TAX NOTES 1365,
1365 (Sept. 5, 1994) (discussing how Sierra Club further weakens the effectiveness of
the UBIT).
" See Marlis L. Carson, Exempt Organizations Still Waiting for Significant Guidance,
66 TAX NOTES 30, 32 (Jan. 2, 1995) ("A Ninth Circuit decision in favor of Sierra Club
would seemingly conflict with the Sixth Circuit, setting up the possibility of Supreme
Court review.").
' See infra Part III.
'5 SeeJennifer Anne Spiegel, Note, Sierra Club: Rationalizing the Royalty Exception
to the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1697, 1737-43 (1995).
15' Id. at 1737.
159 Id. at 1734.
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revenue must be consistent with the rationale behind the university's
tax-exempt status.
160
III. UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE TAxABILITY OF
THE RESULTANT INCOME
While the above analysis demonstrates that income from
technology-transfer activity could be taxable, the central question of
this Comment is whether it should be taxable. This Part will examine
some attributes of university patent-licensing activity that may so
conflict with the requirement of a "substantial relation to a public
purpose" that UBIT treatment would be appropriate. First, this Part
will consider the question of restrictions on publication, concluding
that such restrictions make research activity neither "educational"
nor "scientific" as defined by the regulations. Second, this Part will
address exclusive licensing, which creates many of the same public
access problems as do publication restrictions. Third, a consider-
ation of the effect of technology transfer on teaching will conclude
that universities may be drawing income from activities that do not
provide an educational benefit for enrolled students. Finally, this
Part will address the issue of academic freedom, determining that the
rewards promised by technology transfer may compromise the
pursuit of basic (non-revenue-producing) science that the exemption
was intended to foster. In sum, technology-transfer activity may be
so attenuated from the original exempt purposes of the university
that it could be treated as unrelated business income for tax
purposes.
A. Restrictions on Publication and the Public Dissemination of Research
Findings
1. The Question: To Publish or Not to Publish?
Publication and dissemination of research results lie at the heart
of the research university.'6 ' The faculty reward structure-particu-
16o See discussion infra Part HI.
161 See Michael S. Gilliland,Joint Venturing University Research: Negotiating Cooperative
Agreements, 40 Bus. LAW. 971, 981 (1985) (noting that private companies "should not
underestimate the importance to scholars of publishing research results" and that
most universities follow a "publish or perish" policy); see also Donald R. Fowler,
University-Industry Research Relationships: The Research Agreement, 9J.C. & U.L. 515, 523




larly the granting of tenure-is in large part based upon both the
quantity and the quality of a faculty member's laboratory work.'62
The importance of the freedom to publish is demonstrated by the
fact that of forty-nine universities surveyed, thirty-two had developed
written policies concerning this right and responsibility."3 The
policy of Harvard University includes a blanket prohibition against
the performance of any research done on the University's time or
utilizing its facilities that cannot be published, maintaining that such
a restriction would be contrary to the mission of higher educa-
tion.164
At the 1982 Pajaro Dunes Conference, university presidents and
administrators met to discuss common concerns arising from industry
support of the burgeoning biotechnology-research field. The draft
statement emerging from the conference addressed the importance
of publication. 65  In discussing the development of research
agreements, the conferees concluded that the relationship between
industry and the academy "should not result in a secrecy that would
harm the progress of science," and also that prompt publication of
research results should remain of paramount importance. 66
The for-profit corporate licensees-those who ultimately benefit
from the technologies and make royalty payments to the universi-
ties-have a different set of priorities and motivations when
confronted with questions of publication and the dissemination of
research results.' 67 A corporation seeking to maintain a compet-
162 SeeDAVID A. DiTrs ET AL., ASSESSING WHAT PROFESSORs DO: AN INTRODUCTION
TO ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL IN HIGHER EDUCATION 65 (1994) ("Over the
past several decades, the efforts of college and university professors have been
increasingly devoted to research... .The greater weight assigned to research in
personnel evaluations reflects the trend and has led to increased scrutiny of methods
by which scholarly productivity is measured."); see also HENRY ROSOvSKY, THE
UNIVERSITY: AN OWNER'S MANUAL 189-212 (1990) (describing the process by which
Harvard University determines the award of tenure, which includes a careful study of
the professor's research accomplishments).
"6 See April Burke, University Policies on Conflict of Interest and Delay of Publication, 12
J.C. & U.L. 175, 187 (1985) (noting that most of the statements regarding publication
were admonitions that the institution is committed to the publication and open
dissemination of ideas).
'64 SeeRobison & Sanders, supra note 13, at 233 (contending that many universities
are straying from their commitment to the open dissemination of research results and
citing Harvard's policy as an exception).
1' See Pajaro Dunes Conference, Draft Statement (Mar. 25-27, 1982) [hereinafter
Pajaro Dunes], reprinted in 9 J.C. & U.L. 533, 535 (1982-1983) (reporting the
conclusions of the biotechnology conference held at Pajaro Dunes in March 1982).
6 Id.
167 See Burke, supra note 163, at 184-85 (noting, through an example, that a
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tive edge against its competitors may endeavor to keep discoveries
and advances secret for as long as possible. While some businesses
may wish to keep information secret only for the time it takes to
obtain a patent, some would prefer an even longer period, and some
would prefer no publication whatsoever. The conflict in priorities is
apparent. As one writer has commented, "[o]ne rather mercenary
solution in the development of technology-transfer agreements is to
encourage university personnel to waive the right to publish in
exchange for a share of license fees and royalties.""16 Those within
the academy are troubled by such arrangements: eighty-seven
percent of university administrators polled find a publication delay
to be problematic if it extends beyond the time needed to obtain a
patent. 
169
Some compromise on this matter is necessary if technology
transfer is to be fostered. Without any delay in the publication of
research findings, new discoveries might be released to the public
before there has been an opportunity to obtain a patent. This would
effectively eliminate any corporate incentive to engage in economi-
cally beneficial patent-licensing arrangements. Consequently, there
is a general consensus that a limited delay in publication-generally
from thirty days to one year 170-does not conflict with the funda-
mental mission of the research university. 171  The IRS has con-
firmed the validity of this publication delay, determining that a
"reasonabl [e]" delay in the publication of research results does not
transform subsequent proceeds from that research into unrelated
business income. 172 The Bayh-Dole Act provides further reinforce-
conflict of interest exists between the role of the professor to publish and the role of
a company president to keep sensitive information secret); Slind-Flor, supra note 25,
at A26 (noting concerns that the new university interest in income from intellectual
property could have a chilling effect on the dissemination of knowledge).
'6 Gilliland, supra note 161, at 982 (explaining that a monetary incentive may be
insufficient because academic values generally emphasize peer recognition over
monetary success).
169 See Fowler, supra note 161, at 524-25.
170 See Burke, supra note 163, at App. F. (listing the permissible publication-delay
periods for different schools); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and
Academic Values in Sponsored Research, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1363, 1396-97 (1988) (noting that
typical university policies allow for publication delays ranging from 90 days to one year
in order to file a patent application).
171 See Fowler, supra note 161, at 524 (reporting that 82% of researchers believe
that it is permissible to delay publication for the time necessary to achieve patent
protection).
1-1 Rev. Rul. 76-296, 1976-2 C.B. 142, 143. The Service concluded:
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ment for the proposition that a reasonable delay in publication is
permissible; it declares that "[f]ederal agencies are authorized to
withhold from disclosure to the public information disclosing any
invention in which the Federal Government owns or may own a right,
title, or interest ... for a reasonable time in order for a patent
application to be filed."'73 The conferees from the Pajaro Dunes
meeting similarly concluded that brief delays in publication for
patent coverage should be permissible. 74 If publication is "ade-
quate and timely," '75 taxability will not be at issue.
2. Tax Consequences of Substantial Delays in Publication or the
Suspension of Publication Rights
As discussed in Part II, in order to qualify as an institution
organized and operated for educational purposes, one of the
requirements under the Treasury regulations is that the organization
"instruct[] ... the public on subjects useful to the individual and
beneficial to the community."176  Therefore, the requirement to
publish or otherwise make available research results is not only of
philosophical importance but also lies at the heart of the § 501 (c) (3)
general tax exemption granted to educational institutions.1 77 In
the absence of publication, it becomes difficult for an institution to
claim that a research endeavor is truly serving an educational
Since the regulations recognize the right of the sponsor to obtain patents
... resulting from the research, publication is not required in advance of
the time at which it can be made public without jeopardy to the sponsor's
right by reasonably diligent action to secure any patents... resulting from
the research.
Id.
'7 35 U.S.C. § 205 (1994).
174 See Pajaro Dunes, supra note 165, at 535.
"7 Rev. Rul. 76-296, 1976-2 C.B. at 142.
176 Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (d) (3) (i) (b) (as amended in 1990); see also Phi Delta
Theta Fraternity v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 1033, 1039 (1988) (citing Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501 (c) (3)-l(d) (3) (i) and asserting that "[w] hether a purpose is educational has
been interpreted to imply more than the conveying of information or the providing
of instruction, especially where the activity is conducted for a substantial nonexempt
purpose" (citation omitted)); cf. United States v. American College of Physicians, 475
U.S. 834, 849 (1986) (holding that advertisements in a physicians' journal do not
"contribute importantly to thejournal's educational purposes" and that, consequently,
the journal must pay taxes on profits earned from selling advertising space).
177 For example, in Rev. Rul. 68-438, the IRS concluded that an organization
formed to lessen racial and religious discrimination was operated for educational
purposes and was thus exempt from the income tax because it disseminated
information through a publication program and a speakers' bureau. See 1968-2 C.B.
209, 209-10.
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purpose and, consequently, difficult to argue that the activity is not
an unrelated business.
Far more attention has been paid to the necessity of publication
for an institution to claim exemption from UBIT as a scientific activi-
ty.17 8  For an organization to gain exemption as a "'scientific'
organization," its research activity must serve a public rather than a
private interest.179 An organization satisfies this requirement if it
makes research results available to the public on a nondiscriminatory
basis or publishes the results in a treatise, thesis or other publication
available to the public.
80
The Service derives its current stance on the importance of
publication from Revenue Ruling 76-296. l This Revenue Ruling
considered two different activities conducted by an exempt scientific
organization. In the first situation, the organization regularly
published the results of its commercially sponsored research in a
form that was available to the public.8 2 In the second situation,
the organization either significantly delayed publication or failed
altogether to publish research results in order to protect information
that the corporate sponsor wished to keep secret.8 3 The Service
maintained that research would only be regarded as directed toward
the public, and therefore carried on in the public interest, "if it is
carried on for the purpose of obtaining scientific information, which
is published in a treatise, thesis, trade publication, or in any other
form that is available to the interested public."8 4 Therefore, in the
first situation, because the information was published in an adequate
and timely manner (generally defined as no longer than needed to
obtain a patent'85 ), the IRS considered the activity to be carried on
in the public interest and thus exempt. The Service continued:
With respect to [the second situation], however, in which publication
of the results of commercially sponsored scientific research is withheld
178 The all-encompassing nature of the "for any person" exception for university
research, see I.R.C. § 512(b) (8) (1994); see also supra Part II.C.1, is perhaps the best
explanation for the dearth of cases and IRS determinations regarding the research
income of colleges and universities. Much of the analysis in this subsection, therefore,
focuses on examples concerning exempt research institutes.
' Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (5) (i) (as amended in 1990).
"' See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-l(d) (5) (iii) (as amended in 1990).
181 1976-2 C.B. 142.
'2 See id. at 142.
183 See id.
"8 Id. at 142; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-l (d) (5) (iii) (c) (2) (as amended in
1990).
a' See Rev. Rul. 76-296, 1976-2 C.B. 142, 143.
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entirely or delayed significantly beyond the time reasonably necessary
to establish patent or other ownership rights in the results of the
research in order to accommodate the sponsor's business interest in
maintaining the secrecy of certain processes or to control the timing of
public disclosure of the results, the requirements of the publication test
are not met. The research connected with such projects, therefore, is
not scientific research carried on in the public interest within the
meaning of section 501(c) (3) of the Code.
86
While this Revenue Ruling concerned income from a research
contract, the analysis for patent licensing should be practically
identical. Consequently, when licensing agreements are made
pursuant to a clause that impermissibly interferes with the duty to
publish, the Service should no longer characterize the research that
led to the agreement as "scientific" and therefore should declare the
income taxable under UBIT.
In a sense, unpublished research presents the same problem as
does university operation of hotels or television stations. The
university tax exemption should only be applicable when the
university is producing a "product" that the public has expressed a
desire to subsidize. Section 501(c) (3) and the corresponding
regulations governing educational and scientific activities specifically
define this exempt "product" as research to which the public will
have access via publication. Unpublished research does not serve
this exempt purpose, and therefore the subsequent revenues should
be subject to UBIT.
When a commercial laboratory discovers a new technology, it
converts that technology to for-profit use, and the public generally
has no access to the research. When a university discovers a
technology, engages in technology transfer and refuses to publish the
results of the research, the university, like the commercial laboratory,
has engaged in the development of a technology solely for profit. If
there is no difference between the activity of a commercial laboratory
and that of a university, there should be no difference in the tax
treatment given to the activities. The "product" that the public is
subsidizing is publication, not technology transfer, and the federal tax
regime should reflect that fact.
Im Id. at 143.
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3. Additional Considerations: Editorial Rights for Businesses and
Trade Secret Protection
Two additional issues merit brief consideration. The first is that,
occasionally, a corporation reserves the right to review a preliminary
or final draft of an article and make editorial changes to the text of
that piece prior to publication in order to protect a corporate
interest. 8 7 Most often this type of arrangement occurs in spon-
sored research arrangements, under which a corporation provides
up-front money to a university or research institute in exchange for
exclusive or preferred access to any discoveries that may result. 88
Similarly, a patent-licensing agreement could contain a clause
providing the licensor-corporation with the right to review and edit
forthcoming publications of the licensee-university (or professor).
Placing a potential limitation on the content of an article, treatise or
thesis is no less problematic than placing a restriction on when or if
it may be published at all. After all, the deleted material may be
precisely that which would be most interesting to the public and that
which most deserves subsidization. Arguably, the public's need or
right to know increases in direct proportion to the licensor-
corporation's perceived need to suppress the information. Are
research results that are published only upon the review and edit of
a corporate entity truly serving a "public purpose" such that
subsequent revenue should receive preferential treatment under the
§ 501 (c) (3) exemption and the unrelated business income tax? The
answer to this question should be no.
The second issue relates to the possibility of obtaining trade
secret protection for university research discoveries. Trade secret
protection allows any information "used in a trade or business that
lends a competitive advantage and is not generally known within the
trade or industry" to be kept confidential from competitors, even in
the face of evidentiary requests. 89 While trade secrets are vital to
industry,9 ' they are difficult to maintain. If competitors obtain the
'87 See Burke, supra note 163, at 187 (noting that some agreements permit a
sponsor of research to review the manuscript prior to publication); Gilliland, supra
note 161, at 982 (explaining that some companies have the right to delete sensitive
information from works about to be published).
188 For an excellent discussion of sponsored research agreements and the issues
that companies and universities should consider prior to entering into such
arrangements, see Gilliland, supra note 161.
189 Gilliland, supra note 161, at 979.
'9 See id. at 978.
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protected information through any legitimate means, the trade secret
protection is destroyed.' 91 Since trade secret law prohibits any and
all disclosure or sharing of protected information, it is clearly and
fundamentally incompatible with the publication-oriented mission of
the university. 92 As long as a university adheres to a policy of
prohibiting the absolute secrecy of research results by encouraging
or mandating publication, trade secret protection for university
research products is not realistic. 93 Were a university to adjust its
policies,'94 however, to allow discoveries to be treated as trade
secrets in cooperation with a corporate sponsor, a taxability issue
would arise. The categorical bar to any publication or dissemination
of results required to maintain trade secret protection 9 5 would
violate the regulatory definitions of educational and scientific activity.
Consistent with Revenue Ruling 76-296, any revenues derived from
the unpublished trade secret would be classified as unrelated
business income.' 96  Therefore, before a university considers
granting trade secret protection as part of a technology-transfer
arrangement, it should consider the potential tax ramifications of
that choice.
19, See 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.0511] (1996) ("Since
secrecy is a requisite element of a trade secret, it follows that unprotected disclosure
of the secret will terminate that element and, at least prospectively, forfeit the trade
secret status." (citation omitted)).
"92 See Pat Shockley, The Availability of "Trade Secret" Protection for University Research,
20 J.C. & U.L. 309, 315 (1994) ("Although no courts have determined whether
university research could be protected as a trade secret, it would not be possible for
both publication of and trade secret protection for university research.").
"I3 See id. at 316 (explaining that universities may have to adjust their rules on
publication if they wish to obtain additional research funding).
194 Certain states have changed their trade secret laws to allow state-run institutions
to engage in trade secret protection for university research. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 7-74-102(3) (1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-761(3) (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 765,
para. 1065/2(c) (Smith/Hurd 1993). See generally Shockley, supra note 192, at 316-22
(examining state variations of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
195 See MILGRIM, supra note 191, at § 1.05[2] ("Disclosure [of a trade secret] in a
technical publication of sufficient detail and sequence as to permit one skilled in the
art to devise the subject matter would appear to terminate secrecy." (citation
omitted)).
196 Research that obtains trade secret protection may not even be "research" at all
as defined by Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-l(f)(4) (as amended in 1992), which does not
include "activities of a type ordinarily carried on as an incident to commercial or
industrial operations." Generally, this issue arises when a university is merely testing
or inspecting materials or products. Yet, the Service could invoke this subsection if
trade secret protection were at issue, under the theory that by protecting the trade
secret, the university is in actuality a participant in the commercial enterprise and is
acting in a manner incident to the company's operations.
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B. The Problem of Exclusive Licensing Agreements
Exclusive licensing arrangements present many of the same
concerns as limitations on publication. Once a university has
obtained a patent, it has the option either to license that patent to
one corporation exclusively or to many corporations (nonexclusive
licensing). It is in the best interests of a business to possess an
exclusive license, since it gives that company sole access to the
valuable invention or technology. Furthermore, the university may
have a financial incentive to enter into exclusive licensing, since the
negotiated royalty rate may be more favorable. There is a legitimate
question, however, as to whether exclusive (or even nonexclusive)
licenses are actually in the public interest.197 One commentator
has asserted that "[b] ecause universities have a general commitment
to the public interest through their educational and research
programs and research in universities is heavily supported by public
funds, university licensing's principal goal always is serving the public
interest."1 9 All taxpayers (including corporate taxpayers) have
subsidized the research leading to the patent by allowing the
university to operate as a tax-exempt entity. Yet, with exclusive
licensing, the university possesses the ability to grant a monopoly
over the invention or technology.
The restriction of access through exclusive licensing has proven
problematic for universities from a philosophical standpoint.1 99
Historically, universities have endeavored not to engage in exclusive
licensing arrangements, but there are indications that a more
permissive attitude is emerging.20 Participants at the Pajaro Dunes
Conference noted that "universities should be able to negotiate
exclusive licenses provided that exclusivity seems important to allow
prompt, vigorous development of the patent to occur. The desirabili-
ty of exclusivity in certain cases is recognized under current federal
law., 201
" SeeJoyce Brinton, Biotechnology Licensing: Issues from the University Perspective 16
AIPLA Q.J. 479, 483-84 (1989) (noting a consensus of opinion that the public interest
will not be served if a license-holder "is unable or unwilling to pursue development
diligently").
'9 Id. at 483.
'9 See Nannerl 0. Keohane, The Mission of the Research University, D.EDALUS, Fall
1993, at 101, 122 ("Proprietary knowledge is sometimes important for corporate
success, but it is in principle antithetical to the openness in sharing knowledge that
is at the heart of the university's mission.").
2"0 See Gilliland, supra note 161, at 976.
201 Pajaro Dunes, supra note 165, at 536.
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The granting of an exclusive license, debatable on philosophical
grounds, is also problematic in terms of the federal tax exemption
for universities. The Treasury regulations state:
An organization will not be regarded as organized and operated for
the purpose of carrying on scientific research in the public interest
... if... [s]uch organization retains (directly or indirectly) the
ownership (or control) of more than an insubstantial portion of the
patents ... resulting from its research and does not make such
patents... available to the public.
20 2
The Regulation makes it clear that technologies developed by exempt
institutions should be public goods made available to the public
without restrictions on their consumption. °3  In an exclusive
licensing setting, the university's ability to control and/or ration the
benefits of its taxpayer-subsidized effort violates the regulatory
provision. When a university establishes an exclusive licensing
arrangement, the public is thereby denied access to its public
property.
Such a situation is contrary to the philosophy behind the
§ 501 (c) (3) tax exemption. Assume Corporation A obtains an
exclusive license from University Y. Only A is permitted to use the
technology; Corporations B, C and D are shut out. The result is
identical to one in which Corporation A developed the new technolo-
gy in its own laboratory and obtained its own patent. Corporations
A, B, C and D, however, all bear equally the burden of University Y's
tax exemption: all pay the same corporate tax rate. Clearly such an
arrangement is inequitable because the benefit of the technology
inures to just one corporation. The fact that such exclusive licenses
may be granted for only a short term is an unavailing solution
because, as explained in Part I, most university technologies are in
the rapidly changing biomedical and genetics fields and do not have
a long useful life. 4 Because exclusive licensing arrangements
212 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-l (d) (5) (iv) (b) (as amended in 1990) (emphasis
added).
203 This was recognized during the congressional debates on the Bayh-Dole Act. In
remarks critical of the legislation, the Honorable Jack Brooks noted that the
intellectual products of nonprofits, which are funded both directly (grant money) and
indirectly (tax exemption) by the taxpayers, are undeniably "public property." See
H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6460, 6487 (dissenting views of Hon. Jack Brooks) (arguing that the "assigning [of]
automatic patent rights and exclusive licenses to companies and organizations for
inventions developed at government expense is a pure giveaway of rights that properly
belong to the people").
204 See supra Part I.B.3.
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violate the Regulation's requirement that an exempt scientific
organization make patents "available to the public,""5 the tax
treatment of income derived from such agreements should recognize
this private benefit. Restated, the Service should treat the income as
if it were earned in a business distinct from the university's educa-
tional and scientific exempt purposes and therefore subject to I.R.C.
§ 511.
C. Effects on the Educational Mission of the University
1. The University's Emphasis on Research and the Effect of
Technology Transfer
While the importance of research and the advancement of
scientific knowledge are vital to the operation of the research
university, teaching is still the central mission of the American
university."5 In the words of Nannerl 0. Keohane, President of
Duke University, "Educating ... is part of our distinctive contribu-
tion to improving the human condition, one of the ways in which we
carry out our responsibility to serve society. The most distinctive and
effective way we do this is by sharing knowledge with new generations
of students, both graduate and undergraduate.
20 7
There is a prevalent argument that the increasing emphasis on
technology transfer-and on university ties with business and industry
generally-is exacting a toll on the pedagogical aspect of the
university mission. First, faculty time is a zero-sum game, and the
more time spent on research with commercial potential, the less time
spent on basic science and scientific education. This "dilemma" has
been described by James Fairweather of the Center for the Study of
Higher Education at Penn State University as follows:
205 Treas. Reg. §1.501(c) (3)-(1) (d) (5) (iv) (b) (as amended in 1990).
206
It is the special function of the university to combine education with
research, and knowledgeable observers believe that this combination has
distinct advantages both for teaching and for science and scholarship....
Without the marriage of teaching and research that universities uniquely
provide, the conduct of scholarly inquiry and scientific investigation, as well
as the progress of graduate training, would be unlikely to continue at the
level of quality achieved over the past two generations.
DEREK BOK, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MODERN
UNIVERSITY 19-20 (1982) [hereinafter BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER].
207 Keohane, supra note 199, at 109 (discussing the modem university and
responding to some of the contemporary critiques of its mission and direction).
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On the one hand, concern over declining national competitiveness
has led government and industry to ask universities to play a
stronger role in economic development... It also has led them
[academic institutions] to consider stronger ties with nonacademic
organizations, especially those in business and industry. On the
other hand, increasing concern about the quality of American
education has led a variety of groups to push for reforms and
improvements in undergraduate instruction. This social agenda
would require academic institutions to place increased emphasis on
their instructional mission.
20 8
Professor Fairweather concluded that "[t]he type of activities
carried out by faculty working in business-university partnerships are
potentially harmful to instructional quality. The almost exclusive
focus on research in business-university liaisons reinforces the
tendency of faculty to devote more of their workload to research at
the expense of instruction."29 While these comments were
specifically addressed to university-industry collaborative projects, the
logic holds for all technology-transfer endeavors. Universities and
professors are now actively gearing institutional and professional
energies toward research with potential commercial application,
rather than relying on merely serendipitous outcomes stemming
from basic research.2 10
In further evidence of this change of emphasis, universities are
permitting professors to dedicate more time to potentially lucrative
research and consequently have lightened teaching loads.21' Some
208James S. Fairweather, Academic Research and Instruction: The Industrial Connection,
60J. HIGHER EDUC. 388, 389 (1989) (citations omitted).
20 Id. at 401. Critiques of the university's increasing orientation toward potentially
profitable research are growing louder. In a hearing before the House Select
Committee on Children, Youth and Families, Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder
declared that "[t]he focus in higher education today is on research, not teaching."
College Education: Paying More and Getting Less: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on
Children, Youth and Families, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1993) [hereinafter College
Education Hearing] (opening statement of Hon. Patricia Schroeder, Chairwoman). For
a description of how universities have emphasized lucrative research projects to the
exclusion of basic pedagogical responsibilities, see Gaul & Borowski, supra note 16, at
A7. Congresswoman Schroeder fired a particularly stinging shot at university research
when she elsewhere asserted that "[h]igher education has lost sight of its purpose to
educate the public." Del Valle et al., supra note 55, at 114.
20 See Robison & Sanders, supra note 13, at 228 (noting that "technology no longer
waits for serendipitous theoretical discovery"); John T. Sanders & Wade L. Robison,
Research Funding and the Value-Dependence of Science, Bus. & PROF. ETHICS J., Spring
1992, at 43 ("Whereas it may once have been true that the development of theory was
almost solely motivated by theoretical problems set by theoreticians.., one measure
of the success of science has been that this is no longer the case.").
211 See Fairweather, supra note 208, at 398 (explaining that in order to compete
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faculty have even been permitted to "buy[] out their teaching
[responsibilities] with the proceeds from research grants or outside
consulting. 2 1 2 The result of this has been "a visible decline in the
quality of undergraduate education in science and engineering
disciplines.
213
The consequences of such changes are clear: larger classes, more
part-time instruction and less one-on-one interaction with faculty. To
blame all of this on patent-licensing activities would be unfair. Other
university-industry collaborations have devalued teaching and have
magnified the emphasis on research success as the primary criterion
for awarding tenure, endowed professorships and other faculty
rewards.214  The potential rewards available through patent-
licensing activity, however, represent yet another factor in the decline
of pedagogy in the research university.
The possibility of enhanced revenue not only affects a research
university's emphasis on teaching, it may also change the nature of
what is taught. The types of projects that students-particularly
graduate students-may be compelled to work on in the laboratory
are those that have greater financial than educational potential.215
Additionally, projects of a sensitive nature may result in limitations
on student participation or a denial of access altogether.216  The
draft statement from the Pajaro Dunes Conference recognized this
potential problem, contending that "[a]greements should be
constructed ... in ways that do not promote a secrecy that will...
impair the education of students."217 It also admonished institu-
with industry, faculty in high-demand fields carry lower teaching loads).
212 College Education Hearing, supra note 209, at 4.
21" Fairweather, supra note 208, at 391 (citing NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, UNDER-
GRADUATE SCIENCE, MATHEMATICS AND ENGINEERING EDUCATION (1986)).
214 There has been an ongoing debate in the academic community over how
teaching should be valued in making tenure determinations and in the granting of
other faculty rewards. For a general discussion of the topic and one proposed reform
to the status quo, see ERNEST L. BOYER, SCHOLARSHIP RECONSIDERED 27-41 (1990).
215 See Brinton, supra note 197, at 482 (expressing concern that faculty with
financial interests or stakes might "exploit students... by directing their work toward
corporate rather than educational ends"); see also Bok, supra note 10, at 15 (asserting
that graduate students may be drawn into the process of developing commercially
useful products and services, and claiming that this is a sacrifice of "essential
values"); Richard Florida & Martin Kenney, It Is a Mistake to Push Universities into
Becoming Research-and-Development Units of Corporations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 10,
1991, at B1, B1 ("Further, the emphasis on university-industry relations in this country
has created a climate ripe for problems and abuse. Graduate students may be
channeled into applied fields, where ready support is available, and away from more
basic scientific endeavors.").
216 See Fairweather, supra note 208, at 396.
217 Pajaro Dunes, supra note 165, at 535 (concluding that "universities and
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tions to conduct patent-licensing programs so as to promote the
universities' "primary responsibilities of teaching and research."218
2. Tax Consequences of the De-emphasis on Education
Whether or not one acknowledges this change in emphasis and
whether or not remedial steps are being taken, one must nevertheless
question whether faculty who ignore or manipulate their pedagogical
responsibilities are engaged in an educational or scientific enterprise
such that the resultant income should be exempt from taxation. The
university is acting in a nonexempt or commercial capacity when it
allows individual faculty members to dedicate most or all of their
time to commercial interests while either ignoring teaching or using
students as one would use paid assistants in a for-profit lab. The
Treasury regulations recognize the "training of the individual for the
purpose of improving or developing his capabilities" as one of the
public functions of an institution claiming an educational exemp-
tion.219 Furthermore, the regulatory definition of a scientific
institution includes "aiding in the scientific education of college or
university students" as one of the elements that will qualify an
institution as operating in the public interest.
2 20
When a university removes the pedagogical aspect from its
research endeavors, it is no longer acting in a capacity that merits a
public subsidy through special treatment under the Code. If faculty,
aiming for licensing and royalty revenues, are permitted to conduct
their research affairs in a manner that ignores their teaching
responsibilities, then the university's research enterprise becomes
identical to that which would be found in a commercial setting. The
purpose of the § 501(c) (3) exemption is to support activities, such
as scientific education, that the free market does not support; the
recipient of such an exemption cannot abandon that activity and
expect to retain the benefits. Under such circumstances, income
from research activities that do not sufficiently contribute to the
education of college or university students and/or the tax-paying
public should be subject to UBIT.
industries [should] maintain basic academic values in their research agreements").
21' Id. at 538 (emphasis added). The Draft Statement also explained that while
patent licensing provides excellent opportunities to turn inventions into useful
products, university patent programs must be conducted in a manner that conforms
with the public interest. See id. at 586.
219 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (3) (i) (a) (as amended in 1990).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (5) (iii) (c) (1) (as amended in 1990).
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D. Academic Freedom and Research in the "Public Interest"
One of the hallmarks of university research and of professorial
life in general is the concept of academic freedom-the idea that a
researcher may pursue whatever projects she wishes, free from
economic or professional pressures." 1 This ideal is inextricably
intertwined with the public purpose for which the university was
initially established and granted a protected tax status. As Derek Bok
has stated: "One of the reasons that society accepts the policies of
tenure and academic freedom is because it has been persuaded that
the public will benefit in the long run if professors are insulated
from pressures that could compromise their impartial search for
knowledge." '222  It follows, therefore, that academic freedom-the
freedom to pursue science for science's sake-constitutes a public
benefit. For this reason, the preservation of academic freedom is an
important consideration in keeping research revenues tax-exempt.
One commentator has noted that the public provides direct funds to
public universities and indirect subsidies to private universities, and
that the government recognizes them as tax-exempt, nonprofit
institutions under § 501 (c) (3).223 In exchange, the public sets
"high ethical standards for the university... to provide society with dispas-
sionate and disinterested education and research.
'224
It should therefore be apparent that research that does not
comport with the concept of academic freedom could be character-
ized as "not substantially related to an exempt purpose." The
following discussion offers evidence that traditional academic
freedom and unrestricted basic research may be increasingly
compromised as both the research university and its faculty recognize
the remarkable potential for financial gain from technology transfer.
221 See Gilliland, supra note 161, at 984 ("Those who remain at universities rather
than marketing their skills do so to remain free of commercial bias. Limiting this
freedom will jeopardize the quality of the long-term research effort.").
22 Bok, supra note 10, at 17.
223 See Kenney, supra note 59, at 129-30 (discussing the need for universities to hold
higher ethical standards than commercial researchers).




It has been hypothesized that universities, in search of new
sources of income, are either directly or indirectly placing pressure
on their faculty to pursue projects with commercial, rather than
academic, potential.225 Of particular concern is the possibility that
the faculty-reward structure-the granting of tenure, the awarding of
endowed professorships, the receipt of larger offices, laboratory
spaces and the like-may ultimately be tied to the profitability, rather
than the academic merit, of a faculty member's research.226
Universities favorably view faculty who are better able to obtain
outside funding (which includes technology-transfer revenue) .227
Such a shift in research priorities creates ethical problems for
academic institutions. The participants at the Pajaro Dunes
Conference concluded that universities should develop appropriate
rules and procedures "to insure that faculty members fulfill their
responsibilities to teaching and research, and to avoid conflicts of
interest.
22 1
Beyond ethical considerations, the absence of traditional
academic freedom also conflicts with the rationale for exempting
university research income. Among the reasons that university
research has been granted a favorable tax status is the assumption
that academic research is fundamentally different from commercial
research.229  As one commentator has noted: "The differences
22 See, e.g., Chew, supra note 45, at 306 (explaining that in order to encourage
sponsored research agreements, universities encourage faculty members to structure
their research interests to fit the agenda of the sponsoring entities).
22 See Tom L. Beauchamp, Ethical Issues in Funding and Monitoring University
Research, 11 Bus. & PROF. ETHICSJ. 5, 8 (1992) (describing the predicating of tenure
decisions on the ability to raise money as an increasing trend in the modem university
research environment); Chew, supra note 45, at 306 (explaining that while some
pressures on faculty may be subtle, the pressures may also take the form of the
granting or denial of tenure, promotions or salary increases (citing Federal Response to
Misconduct in Science: Are Conflicts of Interest Hazardous to Our Health ?: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1989))).
2 See Fainveather, supra note 208, at 393-94 (explaining that when teaching and
research are in conflict, research usually prevails and that "[the university] reward
structure is reinforced by the university's desire for faculty to obtain external research
funding"); Katherine S. Mangan, Hahnemann U. Angers Faculty with Threat to Fire Those
Who Don't Attract Grant Money, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 5, 1994, at A20.
228 Pajaro Dunes, supra note 165, at 538. But see generally Sanders & Robison, supra
note 210, at 33 (citation omitted) (explaining that science historically has neverbeen
free from extrascientific considerations).
' See Yang, supra note 66, at 1865 ("By exempting universities from tax, the
Internal Revenue Service in effect spurs them to produce a product mix distinct from
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between the university and industry relate very closely to their very
different roles in society. University scientists must be expected to
have very different standards than industry scientists and traditionally
this has been expressed by the fact that university faculty have
focused on 'basic' or 'pure' research.""' University research, in
theory, should consist primarily of basic research, which is "'undi-
rected research pursued solely for satisfying human curiosity and with
no direct practical application intended or in mind."'231 Commer-
cial research, on the other hand, narrowly targets particularized uses
that will lead to present or subsequent profits. It does not require
subsidization. If universities are producing the same research
product as the nonexempt commercial sector, the rationale for a
university exemption is less clear. When schools elect to reward their
most productive professors, rather than those who make the most
noteworthy contributions to the advancement of science, they fail to
recognize that their different tax posture is based primarily on their
pursuit of a different set of research goals. Only the aforementioned
"dispassionate and disinterested research" merits public support, not
endeavors primarily intended to raise revenues. As such, if a
university's internal reward structure discourages the pursuit of basic
science or otherwise compromises academic freedom, the university
should not be able to shield its revenues from UBIT.
2. A Change in Professorial Priorities-Conflicts of Interest
It would be a misstatement to assert that any shift in research
priorities from academic to commercial originate solely from
pressure exerted by the university. Professors, like universities, are
rational market actors and seek to maximize their income when the
opportunity is presented. The chance to parlay laboratory findings
into personal gain makes potential "conflicts of interest" between
academic purity and financial rewards a topic of considerable
discussion among those within and without the academy.
23 2
that of commercial enterprises.").
20 Kenney, supra note 59, at 128.
11 Id. at 1865 (citing Hearings Before Ways and Means Comm., 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
1152 (1956) (statement of Dr. Clifford Furnas, Chancellor of the University of
Buffalo) (further citation omitted)).
232 See, e.g., Brinton, supra note 197, at 481-83; Burke, supra note 163, at 175-85;
Colleen Cordes, U.S. Explores Conflict of Interest in Federal Research at Universities, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 2, 1992, at A28; Michael D. Witt & Lawrence 0. Gostin, Conflict
of Interest Dilemmas in Biomedical Research, JAMA, Feb. 16, 1994, at 547.
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Generally speaking, a conflict of interest in academia arises when
a scientist has a significant financial interest in the outcome of a
research endeavor.3 3 As one commentator described the problem:
[A conflict of interest] arises when objectivity, truth telling, and
disclosing results of research, all essential to scientific rigor and
integrity, are compromised by the desire for greater reward. When
the enrichment of scientists is directly related to the "success" of
the scientific endeavor, society runs the risk that researchers will
knowingly influence the outcome of "neutral" scientific inqui-
ries.
234
A university scientist who ceases to conduct basic research of
academic value in order to focus on projects that may be personally
lucrative may have a conflict of interest.2 5 Another commentator
queried: "Will the reward from the company's consulting fee or the
value of its stock cause the inventor/faculty member to follow a
course different than ideal for an academic scientist, for example, to
skew future research toward improving the licensed invention instead
of pursuing more important basic science questions . . . ?,,216 When
a professor receives money prior to developing a licensable technolo-
gy, a conflict exists. Traditionally, the potential or actual receipt of
royalty income by a professor has not been viewed as a "conflict of
interest."21 7 This presumption probably arose, however, due to the
fact that, prior to the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act and the
increase in university technology-transfer opportunities, royalties were
not considered to be a source of professorial income considerable
I See, e.g., 59 Fed. Reg. 33,243 (1994) (defining a significant financial interest as
one of monetary value exceeding $5,000 and listing significant financial interest as
ownership of stock, stock options or any equity, debt, security, capital holding, salary
or other remuneration or thing of value for services). Note that these conflicts are
especially prominent when a professor is paid in stock or stock options, since she then
possesses a vested interest in the profitability of the product and the corporation. See
Beauchamp, supra note 226, at 9 (stating that medical researchers' purchase of stock
in corporations for whom they have made discoveries constitutes a "sophisticated form
of insider trading if the knowledge is both accurate and non-public").
z Witt & Gostin, supra note 232, at 548.
z See id. (noting the potential problems that arise when researchers have a
financial stake in the outcome of projects); see also Bok, supra note 10, at 15
(expressing concern that research conducted with an eye toward profit may lure
investigators into conflicts of interest or secrecy that may hamper scientific progress).
I'e Brinton, supra note 197, at 481-82 (discussing both the problems that arise from
conflicts of interest and the difficulties of discovering and preventing them).
17 See Witt & Gostin, supra note 232, at 549 (questioning whether royalty income
under the Bayh-Dole Act presents a conflict of interest).
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enough to create a conflict of interest. 8 In light of the course of
events traced in Part I of this Comment, the substantial financial
rewards that royalty revenues now offer should be cause for a
reconsideration of the conflict-of-interest/royalty-income issue.239
The problems associated with conflicts of interest extend beyond
the shifting of research priorities from academic to commercial
projects. Some commentators have expressed a fear that a professor
may be inclined to alter, or "cook" laboratory results in order to
create findings that might enhance technology-transfer opportuni-
ties.24° Further, it is possible that a professor, in the interests of
satisfying a potential licensor, would be willing to delay or forego
publication of her research results if "the price was right." When
financial incentives were small, the impetus for this type of behavior
was negligible; in the new research era, the incentives are far greater,
as is the cause for concern.
The aforementioned public ownership of tax-subsidized university
research has bearing on the tax consequences of faculty conflicts of
interest. A professor faced with a conflict of interest may select his
projects and conduct his research with an eye toward personal
enrichment rather than academic merit. Such a professor is clearly
acting in self-interest rather than in the public interest.24' The
university may be doing nothing to violate its public mission; it may
merely be providing laboratory space, equipment and assistance in
the form of graduate and postdoctoral students. Although the
university may do nothing to encourage a professor to engage in
research projects that fail to conform to educational or scientific
purposes, the fact that the institution is "innocent" does not change
the fact that the income it receives from conflicted professors may
not be substantially related to an exempt purpose. When the
researcher is unilaterally not something that the public has agreed to
subsidize, it is still appropriate to deny the university exemption
23 See id.
29 See BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER, supra note 206, at 142 ("With stakes of this size,
the nature and direction of academic science could be transmuted into something
quite unlike the disinterested search for knowledge that has long been thought to
animate university professors.").
21 See Beauchamp, supra note 226, at 8-9 (enumerating some of the ethical issues
that arise when faculty receive funding from corporate sources); Witt & Gostin, supra
note 232, at 548 (hypothesizing that researchers may influence the outcome of neutral
scientific inquiries when substantial financial rewards are at stake).
211 See Witt & Gostin, supra note 232, at 548 ("Scientists may be diverted from
conducting research of public health or societal value to conducting research of
commercial value .. ").
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under I.R.C. § 512(b)(8) or § 512(b)(2) for the share of royalty
revenue that accrues to the university. It does not matter whether
the failure to conform to the public purpose derives from the
professor or the institution; such revenue should be taxed as
unrelated business income.242
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR UNIVERSITIES AND FACULTY ON
How TO CONDUCT TECHNOLOGY-TRANSFER ACTIVITY
TO AVOID FUTURE TAX CONSEQUENCES
To review the previous discussion and conclude that universities
should abandon technology-transfer activities altogether would be an
attempt to return to a bygone era. Such a conclusion also fails to
recognize the positive benefits that technology-transfer activities have
on corporate access to new technologies. Those who were instru-
mental in passing the Bayh-Dole Act hoped that the availability of
more inventions and discoveries for commercial development would
spur economic growth. Given that universities executed over 2,000
licenses in fiscal year 1994, it is hard to challenge the benefits of
these relationships. 243 Nor is it entirely fair to assume that com-
mercial success is completely antithetical to the university mission;
there have been a number of well-reasoned arguments that a
university environment is strengthened, rather than compromised, by
extrascientific values.
244
It is also possible, however, that one could reach the conclusion
that the status quo should be maintained with a blanket exemption
for all technology-transfer activity no matter how conducted, no
matter how the agreements are structured and no matter how
attenuated the research is from the rationale behind charitable
exemptions. 245 After all, technology transfer is wealth-maximizing.
242 Such a conclusion is not novel, as this problem was addressed in the proposed
IRS examination guidelines. They called for an inquiry into the management of
professorial conflicts of interest to ensure that agreements create no private benefit.
See IRS Guidelines, supra note 31, at 49-50 (calling for IRS personnel to "[r ] eview the
university's safeguards on managing and reporting conflicts of interest" and to review
disclosures made by scientists concerning relationships with research sponsors or
licensees).
24' SeeAUTM SURVEY, supra note 7, at 23.
214 See, e.g., Sanders & Robison, supra note 210, at 38 (arguing that extrascientific
values "highlight[] the value of science within human communities"); see also supra
text accompanying note 61.
24 See, e.g., Exempt Organizations Handbook, supranote 142, ch. (37)89, at 20,777-
3 to 20,777-4 (asserting that amounts derived from an organization's research activities
that do not meet the Treasury regulations' requirements for scientific research might
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Corporations gain access to new technologies; consumers gain access
to new products; and universities develop new income streams.
Furthermore, the university reinvests its share of these royalty
revenues in further research, scholarships, financial aid and physical-
plant improvements. Given the fact that other income sources are
either stagnant or declining,2 46 it may seem reasonable to allow
universities to take full tax-exempt advantage of technology-transfer
receipts, as they do with tuition, alumni donations and other income
sources.
The problem with this line of reasoning is that it encourages
every university in the country to operate a macaroni factory, as did
the New York University Law School prior to 1950. Schools would
claim that as long as they reinvest profits from noncharitable
activities, revenues from these activities should remain tax-exempt.
It is clear that the proper way to analyze taxability questions is to
focus on the source, rather than the destination, of the revenue.
247
Therefore, when technology-transfer income results in restrictions on
publication, exclusive licensing, the downgrading of education, the
de-emphasis of basic research, and profiteering by the professoriate,
the destination of the revenue should not matter-the income
should be taxable because it is income unrelated to an exempt
purpose. As the research enterprise evolves and encourages further
patent-licensing opportunities, it will be more difficult to argue
against UBIT treatment. As for the contention that consumers and
corporations benefit from the new technologies universities develop,
the private sector could perform that function just as well if the Code
248placed the private sector on an equal footing with universities.
This conclusion makes sense when we consider that a tax code is
also a "policy code," designed to encourage certain activities.
Universities enjoy their tax exemption because of a belief that they
are producing research that no other market actor would produce
absent a public subsidy: basic research, publishable research,
research that educates students and research that is usable by the
still be excluded from unrelated business taxable income if the provisions of I.R.C. §
512(b) (7), (8) or (9) are applicable).
21 See supra Part I.B.2.
247 See Iowa State Univ. of Sci. and Tech. v. United States, 500 F.2d 508, 518-19 (Ct.
Cl. 1974) (noting the change in focus from "destination of income" to "source" of
income in UBIT analysis).
248 But see Rose-Ackerman, supra note 98, at 1020-21 (calling for the repeal of




whole society. Projects performed strictly with an eye toward
commercial applications and profitability do not require tax-code
encouragement. If we allow universities to engage in for-profit
activity unchecked, what incentive would there be for universities to
engage in the educational, scientific and charitable activities for
which Congress granted the exemption? For example, if both
exclusive and nonexclusive licensing endeavors receive equal tax
treatment, what is the incentive to offer the less lucrative nonexclu-
sive license?
The solution is for universities to make certain that, in electing
to engage in technology-transfer activity, they remember that they are
benefiting from a public subsidy. If they wish to maintain a different
tax posture from the for-profit sector, research universities must act
in a manner consistent with Congress's intent in granting the
exemption and the letter and spirit of the Internal Revenue Code.
To do otherwise would create a manifest injustice that, given the
current political climate, could lead to a closer examination of other
tax exemptions currently enjoyed by higher education.249 Absent
a change in their mode of operation, U.S. universities may lose
approximately $90 million in annual revenue,25° money sorely
needed to balance institutional budgets.25'
This Comment, therefore, calls for the development of two
distinct types of patent-licensing agreements-taxable and nontax-
able. If the manner in which the university conducts its technology-
transfer activity is in substantial conformity with the letter and spirit
249 The state and local property tax exemptions of colleges and universities have
recently generated substantial media attention. Many cities and towns which serve as
homes for colleges and universities have negotiated PILOT (Payment in Lieu of
Taxes) programs to replace some of the real estate tax income that would be
generated if taxpaying tenants occupied the land. See Cornell Increases Payments to
Ithacafor City Services, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 1, 1995, at B9 (reporting Cornell University's
agreement to increase annual payments to the City of Ithaca to $1 million); Harvard
Will Pay More to Cambridge in Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1990, at B9 (describing
Harvard University's 10-year agreement with the City of Cambridge); Stephanie
Simon, Yale Pledges $1.5 Million to City, Easing Town-Gown Tensions, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 8, 1990, at 74 (covering Yale University's agreement to put its golf course on the
city tax rolls, make voluntary payments to the fire department and convert four city
blocks to pedestrian walkways). One municipality-Evanston, Illinois-proposed
placing a "tuition tax" on the tuition receipts of Northwestern University and other
schools located in the town. See Bob Secter, Colleges Fear Proposed Tax on Students, L.A.
TIMES, June 2, 1990, at Al.
I This number was calculated using the fiscal year 1994 figure for royalties
received by all U.S. universities (approximately $266 million) while assuming a
corporate tax rate of approximately 34%. See AUTM SuRvEY, supra note 7, at 19.
21 See supra Part I.B.2.
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of the Code and Treasury regulations, the licensing and royalty
revenue should be nontaxable. If the research enterprise or the
licensing agreement does not reflect the exemption requirements of
the Code and regulations, then the income should be subject to
corporate taxation under UBIT. Universities would be able to
choose which type of agreement they wished to enter into, depend-
ing on the facts and circumstances surrounding each invention or
discovery. The following constitutes a basic, though by no means
exhaustive, list of prerequisites for engaging in technology-transfer
arrangements while still conforming to the § 501 (c) (3) tax exemp-
tion and exemptions from UBIT. Conformity with these conditions
would be determinative of whether the licensing and royalty income
would be treated as taxable or nontaxable.
1. No licensing agreement should call for either a suspension of or a
substantial delay in publication rights beyond that which is necessary to
obtain patent rights. Nor should an agreement contain a provision
stating that professors may not share research results with their peers
after patent rights have been secured. A policy similar to Princeton
University's provides a good model:
In order to fulfill our educational objectives, and with our status as
a tax-exempi institution, research at [the University] aims to serve
a public rather than a private purpose. Results are disseminated
broadly and on a non-discriminatory basis. Thus [the University]
will not undertake studies whose results cannot be freely published.
We will, however, recognize legitimate proprietary concerns of
sponsors where appropriate. Publications may be deferred for an
agreed-upon limited period of time to protect patent rights, and
sponsors may review our publications before release so they are
aware of the contents.
252
This policy balances many of the concerns with technology
transfer: it makes publication the highest priority, but recognizes
that deferral to protect patent rights is also a necessity from the
corporate standpoint. Furthermore, compliance with the Princeton
standard would appear to be in accord with regulations underlying
the § 501 (c) (3) scientific and educational exemptions. On the other
hand, it is possible that circumstances could arise which require an
even greater delay in publication. Some inventions or technologies
may never be utilized by the private sector unless there is a greater
delay in publication than is necessary to obtain a patent. In such a
22 Research Relationships with Industy, Princeton University, quoted in Burke, supra
note 163, at 187 (surveying delay-of-publication policies).
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case, a university should still be able to license the technology,
provided it pays the appropriate UBIT. In this manner, the
corporate sector can continue to benefit from university efforts in
cases where exigencies require a suspension of or substantial delay
in publication. At the same time, the Code can function as intend-
ed-providing a benefit when a school acts in a manner consistent
with its exempt purpose and putting it on an equal footing with
commercial enterprises when it does not.
Ultimately, this proposed system allows a university to make
rational choices when it wishes to execute a patent-licensing
agreement. A university can examine the terms of an agreement that
call for a substantial delay or suspension in publication. If it appears
that the extra royalty income would more than compensate for the
tax burden such an agreement would bring, the university could
choose to engage in the agreement; if not, it could try to renegotiate
the agreement to make it comply with the Code and regulations or
it could reject it altogether.
It is unlikely that the above suggestion would result in a large
number of agreements calling for suspension of publication.
Professors, even if wealth maximizers, are also "publication maximiz-
ers," since it is largely by the number and quality of their published
materials that their institution and their peers judge them.
253
While a lucrative, nonexempt agreement might occasionally be
executed, a university that routinely allowed for suspension of
publication would have a difficult time attracting quality faculty to its
campus. Furthermore, a widespread practice of failing to publish
results would not only raise UBIT concerns but also concerns
regarding that institution's § 501 (c) (3) exemption generally.
2. Income from inventions or discoveries by faculty members who elect not
to engage in the educational aspects of the school should be taxable. This
rule recognizes that one of the public purposes of an exempt
university is to educate its students. Consequently, the technology-
transfer income derived from professors who do not participate in
that public function in a meaningful manner should receive different
tax treatment from that of true educators. 54 Requiring a professor
25 SeeDiTTs ET AL., supra note 162, at 65-76 (noting the importance of scholarship
and suggesting a method to evaluate faculty publications).
, SeeBarbaraJ. Bird & David N. Allen, Faculty Entrepreneurship in Research University
Environments, 60 J. HIGHER EDUC. 583, 584 (1989) (recognizing that professors who
are engaged in lucrative enterprises have different agendas and that "[s]uccess in
technology-driven new ventures seems to require that faculty entrepreneurs leave their
university positions").
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to be an educator to qualify for an exemption would not only
recognize the critical difference between a commercial and an
academic researcher; it would also encourage universities to compel
more faculty members to reenter the classroom. At present,
universities have little incentive to change the behavior of profit-
seeking professors. If the taxability of royalty revenues were made
dependent upon whether the professor-inventor actually taught
students, the university might develop a heightened vigilance
regarding whether professors are teaching classes and advising
graduate students. The Code could thereby help to achieve a goal
that is eluding many universities: getting reluctant faculty back into
the classroom.
Admittedly, the above rule might create potentially overbearing
interference into the operations of a university by the Internal
Revenue Service. Once a professor was issued a patent, auditors
would need to inquire into how many courses a that professor taught,
or how many Ph.D. students she supervised. Increased scrutiny of
faculty and their research activities, however, is already becoming a
reality for many schools."
Since this Comment calls for the coexistence of taxable and
nontaxable agreements, this pedagogical requirement does not
prevent a university from marketing to corporations technologies
invented or discovered by a nonteaching faculty member. Rather, it
means that licensing and royalty revenues from such discoveries
would be taxable. Since the public is only willing to subsidize
university research to the extent that it benefits college and university
students, applying UBIT to revenues generated from nonteaching
faculty is, in a sense, nothing more than repaying the unused public
subsidy.
3. No tax-exempt agreement should allow for exclusive licensing. Again,
this requirement allows the university to tailor the agreement to the
economics of the situation. Consistent with general university
philosophy and the requirements of the Bayh-Dole Act, nonexclusive
licensing would constitute the standard arrangement in patent-
licensing agreements, and the subsequent royalty revenues would be
5 See Carolyn J. Mooney, Critics Within and Without Academe Assail Professors at
Research Universities, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 28, 1992, at A17 (quoting
University of Minnesota professor Karen Seashore Louis as saying that, "It] raditionally
at a research university, faculty have said, 'Trust us' ... . But when times are tough,
people don't feel that's an adequate response.... The issue is individual autonomy
versus the university's autonomy").
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tax-exempt. There may be cases, however, in which an exclusive
licensing arrangement would be far more lucrative for the university.
In circumstances in which the revenue stream created by an exclusive
licensing agreement would be so substantial as to offset the tax
burden, however, the university would be able to make the rational
financial choice. Again, by paying the taxes, the university is simply
returning its unused subsidy.
Additionally, a situation may arise where, in the absence of
exclusive licensing, a promising technology would not be developed
at all by the private sector. To deal with such a situation, the Service
could create a procedure whereby a university could petition for a
UBIT waiver. Such a waiver would allow for the university to enter
into an exclusive licensing agreement but still remain exempt from
taxation on the subsequent licensing and royalty revenues. The
determination whether an exclusive licensing arrangement was the
only practicable means for a discovery to realize a practical applica-
tion-making a UBIT waiver appropriate-would be a question for
either the Service or an independent panel composed of academic
and corporate researchers.
4. The Service or universities should require disclosure of all technology-
transfer agreements in order to determine whether they present faculty conflicts
of interest. In an era in which professors may earn substantial
amounts through technology transfer, conflicts between academic
and financial interests are certain to arise. Almost all commentators
on the question of conflicts of interest agree that disclosure is the
first important step in preserving the integrity of the university
research endeavor.256 Compelling public disclosure would itself
serve a public purpose; it would also allow observers to examine
whether an individual professor was so steeped in licensing arrange-
ments that her role as an objective academic might be compromised.
If it were determined that a professor's pecuniary interest in an
agreement presented a conflict of interest, that agreement would be
taxable under UBIT.
This suggestion may be the most controversial, because it may
appear overly intrusive on the personal and financial life of a
11 See, e.g., Beauchamp, supra note 226, at 11 (arguing that institutional rules
should require disclosure even though such rules sometimes create further problems);
Burke, supra note 163, at 186 ("A key feature of most of the [technology-transfer]
policies is reliance on disclosure as a mechanism to deal with conflicts. Perhaps this
reflects a conclusion that disclosure will inhibit the formation of inappropriate
relationships at the outset."); Witt & Gostin, supra note 232, at 550-51 (suggesting
solutions to the conflict-of-interest dilemma).
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professor. The granting of a tax exemption, however, carries with it
the expectation that those benefiting from it are performing the type
of research that the public has elected to subsidize. Just as with
other aspects of public funding, the public has a right to be
informed about that which they are supporting.2 57  Disclosing
potential conflicts of interest would serve this purpose, allowing both
the Service and the public to know whether scientific or educational
goals are being compromised. Furthermore, the fact that conflicts
of interest will be made public may affect their prevalence. Faculty
members may be less apt to compromise their academic values when
such compromise will be subject to the scrutiny of their peers and
the public. Many universities already voluntarily engage in this
accounting of faculty conflicts of interest.258 The beneficial effects
of such disclosure on the conduct of academic (tax-subsidized)
research would exceed any resultant costs. And, in cases where a
professor fails to disclose conflicts, a taxable patent-licensing
agreement could still be executed.
CONCLUSION
The tax-exempt status of the university is predicated on its
serving a public purpose. When a university engages in activity that
is separate and distinct from this public purpose (such as the
operation of a hotel or restaurant), the Tax Code has an appropriate
solution-the unrelated business income tax. Revenues from
university technology-transfer activities present a hard case: while
scientific research is clearly inseparable from the mission of the
research university, it is equally clear that research activities can be
of such a type or conducted in such a manner that they bear little or
no relation to the educational and scientific public purposes which
originally justified the exemption. Certain aspects of the technology-
transfer research enterprise-publication, exclusive licensing, student
involvement, diminishment of academic freedom and basic research,
27 See Witt & Gostin, supra note 232, at 551 (stressing that "[t] he public must have
confidence that all conflicts [of interest] will be disclosed").
25 See Burke, supra note 163, at 181 (explaining that of 56 universities surveyed,
46 have developed conflict of interest policies); Witt & Gostin, supra note 232, at 548
(noting that "in anticipation of more specific regulations from the NIH, many
institutions have adopted their own guidelines" (citations omitted)); cf. id. at 548-49
(describing the conflict of interest guidelines of, inter alia, the American Medical
Association, the American Federation for Clinical Research and the Harvard Medical
School).
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and conflicts of interest-raise the question of whether such income
should be subject to UBIT.
While such revenues are not currently taxed, this Comment has
investigated the possibility of such taxation. The Service may soon
take a closer look at what has become an increasingly appealing
target; the treatment of these issues in the 1993 Proposed Guidelines
are a harbinger that change may be on the horizon. As such,
universities should carefully monitor their technology-transfer
enterprises to ensure that their conduct is consistent with the public
purpose and philosophy behind § 501 (c) (3). Absent the ability to do
so on a consistent basis, universities should consider the development
of exempt and nonexempt agreements as outlined in Part IV. Such
a system would maximize corporate access to new technologies while
at the same time preserving the exemption for those activities
"substantially related to an exempt purpose."

